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THE POWER AND THE PROCESS:
INSTRUCTIONS AND THE CIVIL JURY
Elizabeth G. Thornburg*
INTRODUCTION

Mention the possibility of jury trial in certain circles and a pattern
emerges: distrust; discomfort; disdain; dismay. As the century draws
to a close, procedure and tort "reformers" clearly dislike the civil
jury.' Changes in the rules regarding summary judgment and directed
verdict allow judges to decide cases that would formerly have gone to
the jury.2 Changes in the rules concerning expert testimony allow
judges to exclude from evidence certain kinds of information.3
Changes in post-verdict review require judges to exercise more stringent review of juries' decisions in areas such as the award of punitive
damages.4 All of these changes are designed to limit the power and
role of the civil jury. Because the jury cannot be eliminated,5 groups

of litigants who distrust it are likely to seek still more ways in which to
curtail its function. 6 The general verdict, in which the jury renders an

* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A. College of

William & Mary; J.D. Southern Methodist University. I would like to thank Ellen

Pryor, Bill Dorsaneo, Jeff Gaba, Tim Davis, Rick Marcus, and Tom Rowe for reviewing earlier drafts of this article.
1. See Robert P. Bums, The History and Theory of the American Jury, 83 Cal. L
Rev. 1477, 1490 (1995) (reviewing Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury: The Jury System
and the Ideal Democracy (1994)) (contending that a truly representative jury that
maintains its traditional role of engaging in highly contextual moral evaluation will be
attacked by elite with political and economic power in other institutions); see, e.g.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 335 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J.,
dissenting) (reacting to a case creating a threshold requirement that plaintiffs show
"extreme degree of risk" as a matter of law, thus removing certain issues from the
jury). The dissent stated: "The only further insight offered to its thinking is the majority's recurrent fear of our right to trial by jury." Id.
2. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (discussing summary judgment); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process,49
Ohio St. L.J. 95 (1988) (discussing the Court's expanded use of summary judgment
and directed verdict).
3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (limiting expert
testimony); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995)

(same).
4. See, eg., BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (reviewing
punitive damage award); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (engaging in due process analysis of judge and jury roles in punitive damage cases); cf.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (holding that Erie &KR.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requires federal courts to accommodate state law
procedural devices limiting jury discretion in assessing damages).
5. U.S. Const. amend VII ("[T]he right of trial by jury shall be preserved ...
6. See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process,1990
U. Chi. Legal F. 201, 206 [hereinafter Galanter, The Civil Jury] (discussing newly focused attacks on juries and proposals to limit their power); Stephan Landsman, The

1837

1838

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

unexplained decision on the case as a whole, will surely be among the
reformers' next targets.
The form of the court's charge to the jury is not an insignificant
question of technical format. Like most issues in civil procedure, the
form of the jury charge affects the allocation of power.7 The form of
the charge can change relationships between judge and jury, between
trial courts and appellate courts, and between plaintiffs and defendants. It can also affect the very nature of the functioning of the jury
and the underlying substantive law. Jury instruction format is an important issue that must be faced by judges and practitioners every day.
Nevertheless, all of these issues have been almost completely ignored
by legal scholars.8 The proper form of jury instructions needs serious
analysis before it becomes enmeshed in partisan political debate.
Otherwise, important questions will be resolved in a practical and theoretical vacuum.
Part I of this article briefly discusses the current federal law concerning the jury charge. It demonstrates that the federal system has
given trial judges almost complete discretion in this area without providing any guidance concerning the policies at stake or the goals to be
achieved. The decision about the form of the jury charge is thus unguided by standards at the trial level. It is also free from meaningful
review at the appellate level. As long as it is legally correct in its
statement of legal principles, the trial court's decision is, as a practical
matter, unreviewable. The courts of appeals have chosen a method of
reviewing jury instructions that operates to save appellate time and
analysis, but which, even after almost sixty years of case law, speaks in
Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an UnappreciatedHistory, 44 Hastings L.J. 579,

580 (1993) (tracing the practices of opponents to the civil jury who utilized procedural
changes to marginalize juries and decrease their power).

7. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U.
Chi. Legal F. 87, 93 [hereinafter Yeazell, The New Jury] (describing the eighteenth-

century changes that altered relationships of power among judges, counsel, and jury);
see also David Millon, Juries,Judges, and Democracy, 18 Law & Soc. Inquiry 135, 152
(1993) (reviewing Shannon C. Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law: AngloAmerican Jurisprudence Before John Marshall (1990)) (describing the nineteenthcentury procedural changes used to gradually diminish jury authority).

8. This article attempts to place the issue of the form of jury instructions in the
context of recent jurisprudential discussions of and empirical insights into the nature

and function of the jury. Scholars have begun to analyze the composition of the jury
in light of these theories. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The
Power,Perception, and Politicsof the Civil Jury, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 325 (1995); Phoebe
A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 29 (1994); Nancy S.
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tex. L.
Rev. 1041 (1995). Scholars have also discussed the effect of other procedural changes
on the jury. See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on
the Future of Trial Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 725
(1989); Yeazell, The New Jury, supra note 7. But no one has re-examined the issues
raised by charge format itself in light of these changes in our understanding of the
political and process issues implicated by the civil jury.
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general platitudes that provide little meaningful help for trial courts
making difficult decisions about charge format.
All this would be insignificant if jury instruction format were merely
a matter of syntactical preference. Part II of this article begins to
show, by using examples, the ways in which the form of the jury
charge can make a difference. By using potential charges in a simple
product liability case, this part shows the kinds of choices a trial court
can make. These sample charges help to demonstrate the effects of
format choices on issues such as juror unanimity, the jury decisionmaking process, the prominence given to various claims and defenses,
the jury's knowledge of the effect of its answers, and the relationship
between instruction format and substantive law.
The remainder of the article argues that abandoning the general
verdict as the norm would not be desirable. Part III begins a specific
examination of the values implicated in decisions about the jury
charge format by looking at issues of instruction format from a political perspective: How would changes in the format of the jury charge
change the political function of the jury? Both the allocation of power
between judge and jury and the actual functioning of the jury as arbiter of community values are affected by the nature of the jury charge.
Part IV then examines process concerns by asking whether charge formats differ in their ability to produce "accurate" outcomes and in
their level of "efficiency" as measured by their ability to save time or
money in transaction costs at the trial or appellate levels. Part V takes
a different process perspective, examining the charge's impact on the
comparative power of the parties to the lawsuit. In doing so, it explores whether format confers procedural advantages and
disadvantages.
Part VI suggests that decisions about jury instructions should be
guided by a policy of enabling the jury to perform its political and
procedural functions, and not by a search for an illusory precision.
The courts' primary concern should be an effort to empower the jury
to understand and apply the law in a holistic and contextual way.
Greater clarity in jury instructions would be an improvement. 9
Greater fractionalization would be a curse. This article concludes that
the courts should adopt a presumption in favor of the general verdict,
with narrower questions allowed only in exceptional circumstances.
The general verdict is well suited to the functional and political needs
of the American judicial system. Reformers' distaste for the diverse

9. See Robert L. McBride, The Art of Instructing the Jury (1969); Amiram

Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of Law or in Light of It?, I Law &
Hum. Behav. 163 (1977). See generally Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow,
Making Legal Language Understandable: A PsycholinguisticStudy of Jury Instnicdons, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1306 (1979) (describing empirical research concerning jurors'
understanding of instructions).
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jury' ° and disagreement with pro-plaintiff verdicts" should not be allowed to disempower this important institution.
I.

THE DISCRETIONARY VACUUM:

CURRENT FEDERAL PRACTICE

In any case tried to a jury, the instructions governing the jury's activities play a central role. This is particularly true of the instructions
the judge provides to the jury at the end of trial. These instructions
explain the law applicable to the case and direct the jurors to reach a
verdict in accordance with certain legal definitions and instructions.'"
The effect of jury instructions on juror deliberation and decision-making is an essential part of the jury's fulfillment of its duties.
The format of the jury charge can make a tremendous difference in
trial process, law application, and outcome. This part examines current federal practice' 3 to determine how the courts understand their

role in writing jury charges. It demonstrates that current law gives
trial judges virtually complete discretion in framing the charge, as long
as the explanation of substantive law is legally accurate. Further, this
discretion is unguided by any consistent vision of the role of the jury
or the effect of different formats.

Courts and commentators agree that the majority of federal jurytried civil cases are submitted to the jury using a general charge. 4 It is
not clear, however, whether this is the result of policy or inertia, and it
10. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 1, at 1490 (noting that a truly democratic jury may
be "incongruent with the distribution of power in economic and political spheres of
American society"); Dooley, supra note 8, at 326-27 (discussing how limits on jury
power coincide with the jury's increasing diversity).
11. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
TranscendingEmpiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124 (1992) (reviewing empirical data
that shows that unsophisticated belief in the pro-plaintiff nature of juries is oversimplified and misleading).
12. Juries have not always been instructed in the law. Until the nineteenth century, American juries were presumed to be capable of deriving the law from community norms, and judges did not instruct them on applicable law. See Millon, supra note
7, at 137 n.4; William W. Schwarzer, Communicatingwith Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 731, 732-37 (1981).
13. Federal practice is important both in its own right and in its tendency to be
seen as a model for state procedural practices. While federal courts handle only
about two percent of all civil cases in American courts, they conduct from seven to
ten percent of all civil jury trials. Galanter, The Civil Jury, supra note 6, at 214.
14. See Portage II v. Bryant Petroleum Corp., 899 F.2d 1514, 1519 (6th Cir. 1990);
Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1979); Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, 9A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2501 (2d ed. 1995); Shaun P.
Martin, Rationalizing the Irrational: The Treatment of Untenable Federal Civil Jury
Verdicts, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 683, 694 (1995). While this assumption is probably
correct, it does not rest on an actual empirical study of federal practices regarding jury
submission. It is also probable that federal courts sitting in states which use special
verdicts (such as North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin) tend to use some form of
special verdict, at least in diversity cases. In addition, use of the special verdict is
becoming increasingly common throughout the federal system. See Wright & Miller,
supra, § 2505.
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is not compelled by the rules. Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure generally describes two alternatives to the general verdict,
and allows the trial court to do as it likes. Rule 49(a) provides:
The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the
form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible
of categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of
the several special findings which might properly be made under the
pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems
most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may bes
necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue.
The rule's advice, then, is meager. The special verdict should ask "issues of fact" and the questions should be accompanied by "necessary"
explanations and instructions. Rule 49(b) describes the separate procedure of using a general verdict accompanied by some specific
questions:
The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms
for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The
court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary
to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and
to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury
both
6
to make written answers and to render a general verdict.'
This part of the rule also leaves much room for discretion. The written interrogatories should be about "one or more issues of fact"
whose decision is "necessary to a verdict" and the jury again should
get "necessary" explanations and instructions. Thus, Rule 49 neither
requires any particular overall format (general/special/general with interrogatories) nor dictates the internal format of whatever option is
chosen.' 7 Nor do the interrogatories need to cover all of the issues;
the court has discretion to choose which questions to ask. 8
The trial judge has unfettered discretion in deciding whether to use
a general or special verdict. The judge "cannot be reversed for his
decision in this regard, whatever an appellate court may think of it.
The rule is a grant of authority to the judge."' 9 While theoretically
the court's decision to use or not use special verdict format could be
reversed as an abuse of discretion, there do not appear to be any cases
15. Fed. R.Civ. P. 49(a).
16. l 49(b).
17. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2512; see also Elston v. Morgan, 440 F.2d
47, 49 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that the district court has discretion in deciding what
issues to submit and the form in which they are submitted).

18. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2512.
19. Charles Alan Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.R.D.
199, 203 (1966).
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that have been reversed on this basis.2 0 In the unlikely event that a
judge announced his intention to use a particular format to give an
advantage to one of the parties, the decision might be a reversible
abuse of discretion. Under normal circumstances, however, the judge
2' 1
can make a format decision "for any reason or no reason whatever.
The rules not only fail to demand a particular format, they also fail
to provide guidance as to how the trial judge should exercise her discretion. 2 Six decades of case law have not ifiled in the gaps. The
courts of appeals have done no more than communicate vague notions
that complex cases require special verdicts more often than simple
ones.' Nor have they given any guidance whatsoever regarding
whether and when to use interrogatories along with a general verdict. 4 An examination of decided cases shows that courts have used
and approved a wide variety of verdict formats, from extremely broad
"omnibus questions" to extremely narrow questions that submit each
element of each factual/legal contention as a separate question, generally without questioning anything but the legal accuracy of the content
of the charge.2 5
20. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2505.
21. Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 6.05 (4th ed.
1992) (quoting Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1948)).
This level of discretion is particularly striking when examined in the context of all of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the trial itself. Collectively, these
rules allow the trial judge extremely wide discretion to run the trial as she chooses
because the content of the rules is discretionary rather than prescriptive. See, e.g., Fed.
R. Civ. P. 40 (assignment of cases for trial); Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 (taking of testimony);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 47 (selection of jurors); Fed. R. Civ. P. 48 (number of jurors).
22. See Pamela J. Stephens, Controlling the Civil Jury: Towards a Functional
Model of Justification, 76 Ky. L.J. 81, 105-09 (1987); Robert M. Dudnik, Comment,
Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,74 Yale L.J. 483, 51516 (1965) (stating that most opinions addressing the use of special verdicts are very
broad and communicate only "attitudes, not standards").
23. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F.2d 950, 959-60 (1st Cir.
1952) (noting that the special verdict has the greatest value in complex cases); Cohen
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1943) (observing that special verdicts
are not useful where pleadings raise only one issue). But see Samuel M. Driver, The
Special Verdict-Theory and Practice, 26 Wash. L. Rev. 21, 25 (1951) (asserting that
the special verdict has the least value in complex cases) (article written by district
judge).
24. See Dudnik, supra note 22, at 516-17 (listing undecided issues and referring to
the "almost total failure of the courts to develop standards").
25. Most cases are submitted using a general verdict. The reporters, however,
show that a variety of possibilities are actually in use. For examples of narrow special
issues, see P & L Contractors,Inc. v. American Norit Co., 5 F.3d 133, 136 n.3 (5th Cir.
1993) (illustrating a fractionalized submission of contract claim); Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1426 (4th Cir. 1985) (submitting express warranty, implied
warranty, and negligent misrepresentation separately); Thrash v. O'Donnell,448 F.2d
886, 890 n.11 (5th Cir. 1971); Ratigan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 291 F.2d 548, 554
(2d Cir. 1961) (noting factual submission of negligence claims); McDonnell v. Timmerman, 269 F.2d 54, 58 (8th Cir. 1959) (indicating that defendant's negligence, plaintiff's negligence, comparative negligence, and damages were submitted separately);
Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 207 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1953) (submitting sepa-
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Once a trial court decides to use some form of special verdict, Rule
49 and its case interpretation provide only the most minimal guidance
on how that special verdict should be structured. 21 The questions as a
7
group should cover all the issues supported by pleadings and proof?1
On issues such as the breadth or narrowness of the questions, the
placement and wording of instructions, and the treatment of apparently conflicting answers, the judge is left to her own unguided discretion.2s Courts are also split on the issue of whether the jury can be
informed of the effect of its answers. 29
The federal courts, then, currently cannot or do not articulate the
basis for their choice of instruction formats. They are therefore only
prepared to deal on an ad hoc basis with proposals to increase the use
of special verdicts. The next part begins to examine why this lack of
standards creates the potential for significant, if inadvertent, shifts in
function and power.
I.

WHAT rr CHANGES:

THE DIFFERENCE A CHARGE MAKES

The law-giving function of the jury charge can be accomplished in a
number of different ways. The different choices provide different
amounts of control over the jury's subsidiary decision-making
processes, modify those processes, and provide different amounts of

information about those processes. Constructing a charge also involves decisions about whether and how much to emphasize certain
claims or defenses and about the nature of the law itself. Specifically,
jury charge format can affect: (1) the degree of unanimity and agreement required for the jury to reach a verdict; (2) the degree of control
the charge attempts to exert over the jury's thought processes; (3) the
ability to highlight specific claims or defenses; (4) the impact of
greater complexity on the difficulty of constructing the charge; (5) the
rate questions regarding speed, control of automobile, lookout, exercise of judgment
and skill, causation, damages, and a question regarding the insurance contract); Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 190 F.2d 935, 937 (4th Cir. 1951) (illustrating
a fractionalized submission of fraud claim). For examples of broad form questions,
see Bradshaw v. FreightlinerCorp., 937 F.2d 197, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1991); Dreiling n:
General Electric Co., 511 F.2d 768, 773 (5th Cir. 1975) (submitting negligence, defect,
and damages to the jury). For an example of a general verdict with interrogatories,
see Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 34 F.3d 932, 946 app. (10th Cir.
1994).
26. Devitt et al., supra note 21, § 6.03.
27. Duke v. Sun Oil Co., 320 F.2d 853, 864 n.5 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating questions

must cover issues tried by consent); Mickey v. Tremco Mfg. Co., 226 F.2d 956, 957
(7th Cir. 1955) (requiring charge to cover all issues pleaded and proved). Anything
omitted without objection, however, can be determined by an actual or deemed finding by the trial judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).

28. See Stephens, supra note 22, at 105-09.
29. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2509; see also Gunnar H. Nordbye, Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota Rules, 36 Minn. L Rev. 672, 682
(1952) (suggesting that juries not be informed).
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jury's knowledge or ignorance of the effect of its answers; and (6) the
implementation of the substantive law the charge describes.
To illustrate some of the choices, it is helpful to look at some different ways that the same case might be submitted to the jury. Assume a
case in which the plaintiff, Ward Cleaver, is injured by an allegedly
defective lawn mower manufactured by Acme Mowers. Cleaver has
three legal theories of recovery, some involving multiple factual
claims. He alleges that Acme was negligent in manufacturing the
mower in several ways, that the mower is a defective product for various reasons, and that the mower breaches an implied warranty of
merchantability. Acme, in turn, has different defenses to these claims,
such as comparative negligence, lack of causation, and lack of damages. How could such a case be submitted to a jury?
Any charge should contain a clear, full, and accurate explanation of
the applicable substantive law. 30 None of the formats involve a return
to the nineteenth century practice of letting the jury supply the law as
well as finding the facts. The issue here is what format information
about the law will take, how it will be allocated between instructions
and questions, and how many questions the jury will be required to
answer. One possibility is a general charge. This would begin with a
narrative discussion of the claims and defenses of Cleaver and Acme,
together with an explanation of the law of negligence, strict liability,
and warranty, and their associated defenses. It would also contain information about the potential elements of damages. Following this
discussion, the jury would be asked only one or two questions:
We, the jury, find for

Answer "Cleaver" or "Acme," according to your findings. If you
find for Acme you will not complete the second item.
If you find
31
for Cleaver, you must complete the following item.
We fix Cleaver's damages at $

Under general verdict format, then, Cleaver, who has the burden of
proof on each of his claims, must get only one "Cleaver" answer in
order to prevail on liability. This answer will not reveal whether
Cleaver convinced the jury on only one theory or on multiple theories.
Within legal theories, it will not reveal whether the jury agreed on a
single version of the "facts." It will show that the jury rejected all of
Acme's defenses, including both affirmative defenses and those that
are basically denials of plaintiff's claims. Similarly, an "Acme" answer
will not reveal whether the jury was simply unconvinced by Cleaver's
evidence or whether Acme succeeded in proving affirmative defenses
30. Jury instructions also contain general procedural instructions for the jury concerning matters such as selecting a presiding juror, communicating with the court, and
proper jury conduct. These types of instructions, while important, are beyond the
scope of this article.
31. In cases involving comparative fault, the jury might be required to answer an
additional question or questions attributing percentages to the various parties.
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applicable to all theories or both. This lack of public revelation does
not indicate that the jury process was flawed; it just means that an
outsider will know only the ultimate result.
If a decision is made to use a narrower method of jury submission,
there are still many options available. One possibility would be to
combine tort-based theories into one question, contract-based theories into another, and consolidate damage questions except where different theories provide different measures of damages. Under such a
system, the jury in Cleaver's case would be asked one question about
negligence and strict liability, one question about warranty, and one
or two questions about damages. Another possibility, still narrower,
would be to ask a separate question, sometimes called an "omnibus"
or "broad form" question, for each substantive theory (and associated
affirmative defenses) and a question concerning damages. Such a
charge might look something like this:
1. Was there a manufacturing defect and/or design defect in the
that was a
mower at the time it left the possession of Acme
32
producing cause of the occurrence in question?
Yes
No
2. Was the negligence, if any, of any of the parties33 listed below a
proximate cause of damages to Ward Cleaver?
Answer "yes" or "no."
a. Acme Mowers
b. Ward Cleaver
If you have answered question 1 or question 2(a) "yes" and question 2(b) "yes", then answer question 3. Otherwise, go on to question 4.
3. Find the percentage of fault, if any, attributable to the parties
listed below.
a. Acme Mowers
b. Ward Cleaver
The percentages found should total 100%.
32. The charge would also need to include definitions of all legally significant
terms used in the questions. These definitions might be placed adjacent to the ques-

tion or in an introductory section.

33. This question combines both plaintiff's theory of negligence and defendant's
contributory negligence defense. The jury would have to be properly instructed con-

cerning burden of proof (namely, that a "yes" answer requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence). An alternative format for all of these questions would place
the burden of proof and standard of proof within each question through a phrase such
as "do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that ....
"
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4. Was the mower unfit for the ordinary purposes for which
mowers are used such that the unfit condition, if any, caused the
occurrence in question?
Yes
No

If you have answered question 1, 2(a), or 4 yes, and, if you answered
question 3(b) with a number less than 50%, then answer question 5.
Otherwise, do not answer question 5.
5. What amount of money, if any, if paid now and in cash would
reasonably compensate Cleaver for his damages, if any, caused
by the mower?
You are instructed that in answering this question you may consider past and future reasonable medical expenses, past and future pain and suffering, physical impairment, past lost earnings,
and future lost earning capacity.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer:

This format has some consequences that are different from the general charge. Now the plaintiff must convince all of the jurors to agree
on the same theory of liability. The format also compels the jurors to
address each cause of action separately. They may in fact do that
under a general charge; but now they have to do it to answer the questions. Because any of the theories would permit the plaintiff to prevail, a "yes" answer to any of the liability questions 34 along with a
finding of damages could serve as the basis for a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff. The construction of this kind of charge will become
somewhat more technical. The court will have to take care that each
question correctly places the burden of proof. In addition, there will
be controversy about the placement of definitions and instructions relevant to particular questions. Should they all be at the beginning of
the charge? Should they
be next to the question to which they per35
tain? Does it matter?
Nothing in the logic of special verdict questions, however, requires
that a court stop there. The charge can be made far narrower. Each
cause of action could be broken down into its component elements, as
34. Depending on the law of the jurisdiction in question, the plaintiff may also
need a finding that he was less than 50% (or some other percentage) at fault in order
to be able to recover anything.
35. Some of these issues will be more significant in state systems that prohibit the
judge from commenting on the weight of the evidence than they will be in federal
court. Nevertheless, this kind of issue will have to be faced even under the more
discretionary federal system. For an example of these kind of issues in a special verdict jurisdiction, see Hyundai Motor Co. v. Chandler,882 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994). See generally Gus M. Hodges & T. Ray Guy, The Jury Charge in Texas Civil
Litigation §§ 11-24 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1997) (discussing issues raised by definitions
and instructions).
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could each defense and each element of damages. Further, each can
be tied to particular factual theories and submitted separately. This
article refers to this model as "separate and distinct" format. As a
check on the jury's understanding or to highlight what are considered
particularly important theories, inferential rebuttal defenses 36 , could
also be submitted as questions. 37The resulting charge in Ward
Cleaver's case might look like this:
1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
was negligent in designing the output guard on the mower?
2. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
Acme's negligence, if any, in designing the output guard was a
proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
3. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
was negligent in designing the automatic shutoff switch on the
mower?
4. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
Acme's negligent design, if any, of the automatic shutoff switch
was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
5. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
was negligent in designing the rotary blades of the mower?
6. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
Acme's negligent design, if any, of the rotary blades was a
proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
7. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
was negligent in manufacturing the output guard of the
mower?
8. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
Acme's negligence, if any, in manufacturing the output guard
was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
9. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
was negligent in manufacturing the automatic shutoff switch of
the mower?
10. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
Acme's negligence, if any, in manufacturing the automatic
shutoff switch was the proximate cause of the occurrence in
question?
36. An inferential rebuttal defense is different from an affirmative defense.
Rather than offering an independent reason for the defendant to prevail, an inferential rebuttal defense offers a factual theory of the case that, by inference, makes it

impossible for the plaintiff to win. For example, the defendant may claim that the
occurrence was caused by an "unavoidable accident," generally defined as some unforeseeable natural condition. h'is defense actually negates the element of causation,
already present in plaintiffs burden of proof, and is in that sense a type of denial.
Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions allow unavoidable accident to be specifically

mentioned in a jury charge, and some have let separate questions on unavoidable
accident be submitted to the jury. For an example of a state court struggling with
whether to include an instruction on unavoidable accident, see Reinhart r. Young, 906
S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995), and cases cited therein.

37. I have omitted answer lines from this sample format in the interest of space,

but they would be similar to the Yes/No options above.
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1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
was negligent in manufacturing the rotary blade of the mower?
12. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
Acme's negligence, if any, in manufacturing the rotary blade of
the mower was a proximate cause of the occurrence in
question?
13. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that design
of the output guard of the mower was defective?
t4. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
defective design, if any, of the output guard was a producing
cause of the occurrence in question?
15. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidenced that the
design of the automatic shutoff switch was defective?
16. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
defective design, if any, if the automatic shutoff switch was a
producing cause of the occurrence in question?
17. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
design of the rotary blade of the mower was defective?
18. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
defective design, if any, of the rotary blade was a producing
cause of the occurrence in question?
19. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
defectively manufactured the output guard of the mower?
20. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
defective manufacture, if any, of the output guard was a producing cause of the occurrence in question?
21. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
defectively manufactured the automatic shutoff switch of the
mower?
22. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
defective manufacture, if any, of the automatic shutoff switch
was a producing cause of the occurrence in question?
23. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Acme
defectively manufactured the rotary blades of the mower?
24. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
defective manufacture, if any, of the rotary blades was a producing cause of the occurrence in question?
25. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
design of the output guard made the mower unfit for the usual
purpose for which mowers are used?
26. Do you find that the unfit output guard, if any, was the proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
27. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
design of the automatic cutoff switch made the mower unfit for
the usual purpose for which mowers are used?
28. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
unfit cutoff switch, if any, was the proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
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29. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
design of the rotary blades made the mower unfit for the usual
purpose for which mowers are used?
30. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
unfit rotary blades, if any, made the mower unfit for the usual
purpose for which mowers are used?
31. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ward
Cleaver was negligent? 8
32. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ward
Cleaver's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
33. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
occurrence39 in question was not the result of an unavoidable
accident?
34. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Eddie
Haskell was not the sole cause of the occurrence in question?
35. What percentage of responsibility do you find from a preponderance of the evidence should be attributed to the following:
Acme Mowers
Ward Cleaver

36. What sum of money, if paid now in cash, do you find from a
preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably
compensate Ward Cleaver for his injuries resulting from the
occurrence in question?
Answer separately in dollars and cents, if any, with respect to the
following elements:
a. pain, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for enjoyment of
life in the past;
b. pain, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for enjoyment of
life in the future;
c. future medical expenses;
d. past medical expenses;
38. These contributory negligence questions could also be made fact specific. For
example, the jury could be asked whether Cleaver was negligent in mowing across a
hillside, mowing in bare feet, or whatever. Each factual theory of contributory negligence would then have two questions, one on breach and one on causation. Similarly,
if there is a defense that Cleaver modified the mower in a way that is relevant to the
defect or warranty claims, those issues could be submitted factually and separately.
Notice also how the separate submission of these questions forces the court to make
decisions about the order in which the questions should be placed. Acme, for example, might argue that the defensive issues should be placed at the beginning, with
instructions not to answer the liability questions if certain defenses are found to exist,
rather than toward the end. Rule 49 contains absolutely no direction on issues such as
this.

39. Note that because an inferential rebuttal defense negates an element of the

plaintiff's claim, plaintiff retains the burden of proof to disprove it. Thus the question

needs to be worded in this convoluted fashion to properly place the burden of proof,

and plaintiff needs a "yes" answer to win. While the wording problem could be cured
by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the result of that shift would be
simultaneously placing the burden of proof on both parties to prove opposite facts,
for example, that Acme was the cause of the occurrence (plaintiff's burden) and was
not the cause of the occurrence (defendant's burden).
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e. future loss of earning capacity;
f. loss of earnings in the past.
With these three examples4" for comparison, one can begin to see
the differences that progressively narrower charge formats could
make. First, there is a significant difference in the degree of unanimity
required for the jury to reach a verdict. This will be felt particularly
by the party with the burden of proof. With the general verdict, the
plaintiff could win by getting all of the jurors to agree with at least one
of his theories. For example,4 ' six jurors could believe that the mower
was defective in design, three that it was defectively manufactured,
and three that it was negligently manufactured in some way, and a
plaintiff's verdict would result. To win under a charge in separate and
distinct format, plaintiff must get twelve jurors to agree on both a particular factual theory and the application of the law to that theory.4 2
In the narrowest example above, Cleaver has to get a "yes" answer to
each element of the factual incarnation of his cause of action. A "no"
to any element will defeat that claim. With the general verdict above,
Cleaver had to convince the jurors that Acme had been negligent in
some way or breached some warranty or marketed a product with
some kind of defect in manufacture or design. Now Cleaver would
have to convince all twelve jurors that, for example, the mower's
blade was defective and that caused his injury, or that Acme was negligent in the way that it manufactured the output guard of the mower
and that that caused Cleaver's injury. It wouldn't matter if all the
jurors thought that Acme was negligent in some respect or that the
mower was defective in some way. Unless they all agree on the same
factual underpinnings, Cleaver would lose under this system of jury
submission. Cleaver would also have to separately convince the jury
to reject the inferential rebuttal defenses, and to fail to find that Acme
proved its affirmative defenses.
A second difference one can notice from reading the different
charge formats-general verdict, broad form questions, and separate
40. I have not set out a separate example of a general verdict accompanied by
interrogatories, the most discretionary of verdict forms. It would look like a general
verdict with the addition of a number of questions. Those additional questions could
cover all issues and look like either the broad form set or the separate and distinct set.
Otherwise, the court has the option of choosing just a few key questions and asking
them specifically in addition to the general verdict. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b). Note that in
case of irreconcilable conflict between the general verdict and the interrogatory answers, the latter control. Id.
41. These examples assume a twelve member jury. There are, of course, jurisdictions in which smaller juries are used in civil cases, and jurisdictions in which a nonunanimous verdict is sufficient. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
State Court Organization 1993, at 274 tbl. 37 (1995). The point remains the same: a
general charge allows the requisite number of jurors to rely on different factual or
legal bases for their answers.
42. As before, the judge will have to instruct the jury about the meaning of applicable legal terms.
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and distinct questions-is the difference in control that the charge attempts to exert over the jury's thought processes. The general verdict
provides the least control, giving a general narrative description of the
parties' theories and the applicable law, then leaving it to the jury to
decide how to evaluate the evidence, reach decisions about ultimate
facts, and render a verdict. The jury also controls the order in which it
considers various issues. The broad form charge provides somewhat
more structure, forcing the jury to focus separately on individual
causes of action. The separate and distinct format is the most structured, requiring the jury to separate out each factual theory as applied
to each element of each legal theory in the order in which the charge
discusses them.
Third, the charge's potential to highlight certain legal or factual theories increases as the questions become more specific. In the example
above, the court has given special prominence to Acme's inferential
rebuttal defenses by posing them as separate questions. Cleaver,
therefore, has to convince the jurors to reject theories of unavoidable
accident and sole causation by a non-party. Both of these defenses
factually attack Cleaver's claim that Acme's wrongful conduct was a
cause of his damages. Thus, Cleaver bears the burden of disproving
the defenses. By submitting these issues as separate questions, the
court has chosen to flag these particular defensive theories. The same
result can be accomplished by choosing topics for special interrogatories accompanying a general verdict. Also, by submitting these defenses as separate questions, the charge requires the plaintiff to get a
favorable answer to the causation issue tvice. Because the charge requires multiple affirmative findings and because it increases the
chances for conflicting answers, it works to the disadvantage of the
party with the burden of proof.
Fourth, the separate and distinct format greatly increases the
number of technical issues that must be addressed in constructing a
jury charge. A format with numerous narrow questions requires more
precision in order to avoid legal error. There are more questions to be
written correctly, more potential for conflict to be reconciled or not,
and more opportunity for harmful error. And the example above involves only one plaintiff and one defendant. The addition of more
parties multiplies the complications geometrically, as does the addition of factual and legal theories.
The increased technicality will manifest itself in a number of ways.
For example, the court must decide how to word questions. Just as
lawyers currently strive to get the court to include definitions worded
favorably for their clients, they will suggest ways to word questions
that are similarly adversarial.43 Other issues involve the order of
43. See, e.g., Scott Baldwin et al., Art of Advocacy: Jury Instructions (1991) (providing that almost every possible instruction in two versions-plaintiff's instruction

1852

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

questions and instructions to the jury not to answer the remaining
questions if it answers preliminary questions in a certain way. These
kinds of decisions can also affect emphasis and comparative
advantage.
Because definitions and instructions are required, problems of
wording and placement will arise. These issues exist with the general
charge, but are even more pointed with the special verdict because
their impact can be increased by placing them immediately before a
narrow, related question. Where do you put them, at the beginning of
the whole charge or next to the relevant questions? How do you word
them? For example, do you say:
"Negligence" means doing something that a reasonable person in
the same or similar circumstances would not have done, or failing to
do something that a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would have done.
or do you say:
If you find that Ward Cleaver's decision to mow the lawn in bare
feet was not reasonable, then you must find him negligent.
Technical issues also arise because of the jury's answers rather than
the court's drafting process. Special verdicts, and general verdicts
with interrogatories, by their very nature increase the probability that
the jury will come back with answers that conflict or might conflict.
The treatment of conflicts requires another set of principles of decisionmaking. How hard should the trial and appellate courts try to find
an explanation for the answers that makes the conflict disappear or
become immaterial? What do you do with conflicting answers that
are not legally material but that seem to indicate some confusion?
Can you send the jury back to deliberate further if you recognize a
conflict before discharging the jury? If you can, how much can you
tell them about the conflict? What do the lawyers have to do, and
when do they have to do it, in order to preserve error to complain
about conflicting answers? The rules can become so complex that
only parties who can afford the most skillful lawyers have any chance
of raising jury charge issues on appeal. All of these issues have been
raised in federal decisions44 and in states that use special verdicts.4 5
and defendant's instruction-covering the same substantive law but with different
emphasis).
44. These issues have created serious problems for the federal courts even with
the current very limited use of the special verdict. For example, sometimes federal
courts are unable to tell a special verdict from a general verdict with interrogatories,
Martin, supra note 14, at 697 n.49, have reached conflicting decisions about what to
do if the jury's answers conflict, id. at 701; Donald Olander, Note, Resolving Inconsistencies in FederalSpecial Verdicts, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1089, 1092-98 (1985), and differ
about the requirements for preserving error, Martin, supra note 14, at 727.
45. For examples of the legal intricacies of preserving error and dealing with conflicting and missing answers when special verdicts are used, see Hodges & Guy, supra
note 35, §§ 91-127.
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They are, in a narrow sense, technical questions, but the answers to
those questions can affect party advantage and disadvantage, the relationship of judge and jury, and the role of the appellate courts in supervising trial court outcomes.
Comparing the possible charge formats reveals a fifth difference
that could prove significant. Under most circumstances, a series of
narrower and more numerous questions will make it harder for the
jury to know the effect of its answers.4 6 With a general verdict, the
jury knows who "wins," as they actually find for plaintiff or defendant.
A lengthy special verdict format, on the other hand, makes it more
difficult for the jury to know which party will benefit from particular
answers. The jury may also mistakenly assume that certain answers
are not important and can be answered so as to give a little credence
or benefit to each party. Such misunderstandings could lead to judgments that do not reflect anyone's idea of the merits of the case.
Sixth, the wording of the charge has the potential to change how
and by whom the substantive law is applied. The jury's role in reaching consensus in a general verdict as to who they "find" for, is different from deciding whether Acme was "negligent," which in turn is
different from its role in deciding whether Acme was negligent in failing to include an output guard and that that negligence proximately
caused damages to Cleaver.4 7

All of the charge formats discussed above leave the jury to apply
basic legal definitions to the evidence they have heard. Even the separate and distinct format requires the court to define of legal terms; to
omit them would be reversible error.4s There are, however, other possible approaches which are real-world possibilities. They are not currently in use, but could be implemented if courts wished to do so.
One possibility is to remove the process of law application from the
role of the jury. It is grammatically possible to write a special verdict
form so that the jury is asked to find only historical facts, with no legal
component. Some advocates of the special verdict recommend exactly this. Professor Saltzburg, for example, suggests that rather than
asking the jury whether defendant was negligent, the judge should ask
a question about the underlying factual allegations: "Surely it is easier
for jurors to understand that they are being asked to decide whether it
46. The federal courts are split as to whether juries may be informed of the effect

of their answers. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2509. Texas and Wisconsin,
states that use special verdicts, have consistently held that the jury may not be so
informed. Id; see, eg., Grieger v. Vega, 271 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. 1954) (stating jury

may not be told effect of its answers).
47. See infra Part III.
48. When the jury is asked mixed questions of law and fact, the court must supply
the proper legal definition. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2506; see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 49(a) ("The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction
concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make
its findings upon each issue.").
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is more likely than not that the defendant drove through a red light
than for them to master the law of negligence and apply it to the facts

of a case."" 9 Similarly, the jury could be asked how fast defendant was

driving or how closely defendant's car was following plaintiff's car. If
plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent in having an inadequate
number of quality control inspectors, the jury could be asked how
many defendant had and how many it should have had. Or the court
could retreat even farther into evidentiary facts. "[D]id the driver
have one or two drinks? [W]as the street dry or damp?" 5 Presumably
the judge would then take these answers, apply the legal definition of
"negligence" and "causation" and render a judgment.
This kind of issue formulation would represent a radical change in
our procedure for submitting cases to juries and in our understanding
of tort law. 5 It is not, however, without precedent in other areas.
Judges have sometimes taken decisions that involve the application of
law to fact, defined them as "questions of law" and therefore put them
beyond the power of the jury. Consider, for example, Justice Holmes'
attempt to transform negligence into a constituent set of precise rules
of conduct that a judge could apply. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v.
Goodman," the Supreme Court found that a driver at a railroad
crossing, if he could not otherwise be sure whether a train was approaching, had to stop and get out of his vehicle. Failure to do so was
negligence as a matter of law.5 3 Such a splitting of the decisionmaking
process would make it proper to ask the jury whether the driver could
see whether a train was approaching and whether he or she had
stopped and gotten out of the car. Based on these answers, the judge
would then apply the "law" and decide whether the driver was
negligent.
This kind of jury charge would no longer require the judge to explain applicable law to the jury or the jury to understand and apply
the law. It would, however, require considerable thought about which
fact issues should be submitted. Since they are not "ultimate" or
49. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 341, 360 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) [hereinafter
Verdict].
50. Dudnik, supra note 22, at 484 n.2; see also Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury
Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1867, 1869-71 (1966) (identifying
the jury's role as fact-finder).
51. It is also not clear whether such an attempt would violate the Seventh Amend-

ment (in federal court) or state constitutional rights to jury trial (in state courts). See

Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question,
and ProceduralDiscretion, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 993, 1008-10 (1986).
52. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
53. Id. at 70. The Court recognized the problem with such attempts to make ultimate fact findings a question of law when, seven years later, it reversed a directed
verdict for defendant railroad and limited Goodman to its facts in Pokora v. Wabash
Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 106 (1934) ("[W]hat is suitable for the traveler caught in a
mesh where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for the judgment of a jury.").
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"controlling," how would the judge know what to ask? In a state
court system that required fact pleading, the charge might be able to
track the factual allegations of the pleadings. Federal notice pleadings, however, do not lend themselves to that kind of precision, and
neither do the liberal rules regarding trial amendments.-' Certainly
the parties could be required to suggest possible questions in a pretrial
order, but the problem would remain: How would the judge recognize a proper question? Can one construct meaningful issues that require the jury to provide a simple yes/no answer and not a complex
narrative?55 What weight would the answer receive when the judge
was applying the legal standard to the finding in order to arrive at a
proper judgment?56
Adopting a law and economics model could also change the format
and content of the jury charge. The three format possibilities discussed above assume that the jury will be asked questions, broad or
narrow, that reflect traditional ways of talking about the law and legal
terms. The questions and/or instructions would talk about "negligence" or "defect" or "causation." There is also another possibility.
Some commentators have suggested that if the law really reflects an
economic decision about efficiency and costs, then the jury should be
instructed in those terms. In a negligence case, for example, Learned
Hand's classic formula could be used: a party is negligent if the burden of avoiding the risk (B) is less than the product of the ex ante
probability that the risk will materialize in injury (P) and the gravity
of the risk if it materializes in injury (L).7 Stated mathematically, a
party is negligent if B < PL.58 Under such a system, the jury, instead
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) allows trial amendments to be made freely in the absence
of surprise or prejudice.
55. I suppose it would be possible to write an open-ended question like "describe
how you think the crash occurred" but that would raise another set of mind boggling
questions ranging from the logistical to the legal/jurisprudential. What, for example,
if they answer the questions by talking about whose "fault" it was?
56. It is possible that in certain kinds of contract disputes, questions that are more
purely factual would be easier to frame. See Nordbye, supra note 29, at 683. For
example, if a contract required Seller to deliver 100 widgets to Buyer on June 1, 1995,

and Buyer claimed that Seller had delivered only 75 widgets on that date, the jury
could be asked, "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Seller failed
to deliver 100 widgets on June 1?" Indeed, there is a tradition of treating certain
contract issues as questions of law to be decided by the judge rather than the jury,
presumably because these commercial issues need more consistency than multiple juries can achieve, or because the democratic jury is not wanted in business cases. See
Louis, supra note 51, at 1028 (listing questions of ultimate fact traditionally categorized as "legal"); Weiner, supra note 50, at 1896-1906 (discussing split of authority in
commercial cases over whether judge or jury decides the reasonableness or timeliness
of commercial conduct). Even in commercial cases, though, many traditional jury
decisions require the jury to apply lav to fact, and a change to questions only about
historical occurrences would change the jury's function.
57. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making Sense
of it All, 49 La. L. Rev. 629, 641 n.68 (1989).
58. Id.
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of being asked about "negligence," would be asked to apply the Hand
formula.59 Better yet, to avoid juror-based mathematical error, the

jury could be asked simply to find B, P, and L (given proper instructions) and the judge could do the math.60 In a strict liability case, the
formula would have to be adapted but the method would remain the
same. One commentator has suggested a formula of B - BK (with BK
representing the burden of knowing or discovering the risk) < PL for
strict liability. Again, the jury need only find B, BK, P, and L.61

Formulas need not be limited to primary liability findings.6' Others
have suggested charging the jury in mathematical terms in order to
make findings regarding comparative fault. In a case with only two
parties (A and X), for example, the court could determine A's percentage fault by using the following formula: ((P[A] x L[A]) / B[A]) /
((P[A] x L[A]) / B[A]) + (P[B] x L[B]) / B[B])).63 Again, the jury
wouldn't have to do this scary math. They would, however, be given
information about how to take concepts such as risk, causation, and
culpability and translate them, together with fact findings, into B, P,
and L for each party. These numbers would substitute for the more
conventional yes/no answers and more intuitive percentages. While
courts don't seem to have gone as far down this road, the Oregon
Supreme Court has discussed the possibility of using formulas rather
than traditional questions in order to calculate comparative fault.' 4
59. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primeron the Pattern of Negligence, 53 La. L. Rev.
1509, 1529-32 (1993).
60. Note, however, that among those who argue for greater use of law and economics analysis in jury instructions, some have rejected the idea of questioning the
jury in this way. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 Va. L. Rev.
1015, 1028 (1994) ("No one thinks that cost-benefit analysis in negligence law is, or
could be, a rigorous quantitative inquiry into continuous increments of marginal
care." (citing Learned Hand's rejection of quantitatively applying the Hand formula
in Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949))).
61. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned
Hand Formula, 52 La. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1991).
62. For a suggested formula to govern a type of antitrust case, see Gary Myers,
Litigation as a PredatoryPractice,80 Ky. L.J. 565, 605 (1992) (liability if (1 - s)(xJ + L)
+ s(1-p)(xJ + L) + s(p)(B) > C + sCd + s(p)(mD + Cp)). In this formula, s =

Probability of antitrust claim; p = probability that target would prevail in antitrust
case as perceived by predator; x = probability of winning the case; J = anticipated
value of money judgment and injunctive relief; L = anticipated marketplace profit
from the litigation; B = benefits from predation until final judgment in antitrust case;
Cp = cost of target's antitrust claim; Cd = cost of predator's defense of antitrust claim;
m=damages multiplier for successful antitrust claim; D = probable antitrust damages
suffered by target firm. Id. at 602-05. Note, however, that the author does not recommend submitting this formula as a jury question. Id. at 605.
63. David C. Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 Ind. L.J. 413, 420 n.58 (1985).
64. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624, 634-35 & n.19 (Or.
1982). The court suggested that the trial judge could instruct the jury to compare
plaintiff's conduct with that of a reasonable person, assigning plaintiff a number on a
scale of 0 to 10 (0 = no negligence; 10 = intent). The jury would then compare defendant's product with a product that would not have been defective, assigning that defective product a number on a scale of 0 to 10. The jury would then add the two
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Unlike the very narrow factual issues discussed above, questions
phrased in terms of economic concepts would require the jury to apply
the law. For example, the proponent of the comparative fault formula
recommends that the negligence jury be instructed about concepts
such as causation and culpability. 65 On the other hand, if the jury is

given no information about the final formula to be applied, this
method of submission might actually hide the effect of its answers
from the jury in a way that no other method of submission has
accomplished.6 6

Taken together, all of these examples of potential charge formats

should make it clear that format choices are extremely significant.67

The lack of guiding principles about how to structure a charge is thus
a serious problem. The next sections of this article explore in more
detail the kind of process and substantive policy choices that the
courts make (consciously or unconsciously) when drafting a jury
charge.

H.

THE IMPACT OF CHARGE STRUCTURE ON THE POLITICAL
FUNCTION OF THE JURY

The jury, as an institution, has both a political function' and a procedural function. This part examines the jury as a political institution,
asks whether the form of the jury charge affects that political role, and
concludes that it does. Except in unusual circumstances, the general
verdict is best suited to empower the jury to perform its constitutional
numbers, then divide each party's fault number into the total. The result will be each
party's percentage of fault.
65. "The court should instruct the jury to consider causation, but only as it affects
their assessment of the dangerousness of each party's risk-producing behavior."
Sobelson, supra note 63, at 424. "[B~oth culpability and direct causation aid in understanding the magnitude of the risk of dangerous conduct, as well as the cost of avoiding that risk." Id. at 424-25 n.88. In strict liability cases, instructions would also
include information about how to define "fault" on the part of the manufacturer. Id.
at 431; see also id. at 432-35 (discussing formulas for finding comparative fault in design defect and manufacturing defect cases).
66. It is reasonable to predict, however, that the jury would still get strong clues
from the substance of the lawyers' closing arguments and from the testimony in the
trial itself.
67. Given the potential significance of the format chosen, one must question the
standard conclusion that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), does not
require federal courts to consider state court methods of instructing the jury when
trying diversity cases. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2502 (stating that federal
courts have uniformly concluded that state law does not govern whether to use general or special verdict, what questions to submit, the form of the questions submitted,
the effect of inconsistent answers, or any other detail of special verdict and interrogatory practice).
68. For a general discussion of the Framers' view of the political significance of the
jury, see Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment,
57 Minn. L. Rev. 639 (1973).
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role. 69 As a political institution, the jury serves two functions that are
relevant here: It expresses community values and experience by incorporating them into legal decisionmaking, and it serves as a check
on the power of the less democratic judge. Both functions are important and better facilitated by the general verdict.
A. Injecting Community Values
Commentators discuss the jury's ability to inject community values
into legal judgments in different ways. Sometimes the jury is praised
for its tendency to ignore rather than to enforce "the law," as when
the jury refuses to apply unpopular law, a kind of civil jury nullification. Thus, early twentieth-century juries that disliked the fellow servant rule in worksite injury cases are said to have refused to apply it.
Juries that disliked the impact of the old contributory negligence doctrine are said to have invented an ad hoc kind of comparative negligence judgment.7 ° While there is some truth in this picture, it tends to
identify the jury's virtue with lawlessness, a value which one tends to
applaud only when one agrees with the particular jury.?
Some commentators, while not suggesting nullification, still identify
the jury with a refusal to rigorously apply the law. They describe the
jury as an agent of "mercy" in contrast to the judge's sterner role of
law application.7 2 This view, while appreciating the jury's ability to
69. See Yeazell, The New Jury, supra note 7, at 117 ("[B]oth those who attack and
those who defend the modem jury ought to be clear about the political character of
the institution under discussion ... one cannot simply discuss the jury as if it were an
entirely utilitarian institution to be judged by how well it performed a factfinding
function.").
70. See Landsman, supra note 6, at 610; Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 68, 81-82 (1981).
71. For example, one might applaud the early juries that refused to award no damages to a plaintiff who was one percent negligent but deplore the jury that acquitted
the assailants of Rodney King. Jury nullification even in criminal cases also remains
extremely controversial. For a sampling of the recent debate on jury nullification in
criminal cases, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
CriminalJustice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury
Nullification, 82 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1996); Jack B. Weinstein, ConsideringJury "Nullification": When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 239 (1993); Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and
ConstitutionalDeficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 Yale L.J. 2563 (1997).
72. See Devitt et al., supra note 21, § 6.03 (stating proposition that special verdicts
make the law cold and business-like, rather than warm and human); see also Jennifer
M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices
Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 505, 536 (1995) (labeling the jury as the
"humanitarian custodian of the law"); John H. Wigmore, A Programfor the Trial of a
Jury Trial, 12 J. Am. Judicature Soc'y 166, 170 (1929) ("The jury, in the privacy of its
retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the particular case. Thus
the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular satisfaction is
preserved.").
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apply community values, nevertheless contributes to the picture of the
jury as a kind of rogue element within the judicial process."1
The jury's role in infusing the trial process with community values,
however, is both more subtle and more pervasive. First, in most cases
the jury's decision is explicitly value-laden.74 For example, decisions
such as whether a party's actions were "reasonable," whether a product's social utility exceeds its risk, whether a contract term was unconscionable, whether a breach of contract should be excused, or whether
a police officer's use of force was "excessive" are not value-neutral
inquiries into historical fact. They are questions to which the answers
depend on societal norms, as supplied by the jury."

Second, jurors apply community norms, in the form of each juror's
experience of life in the community, in evaluating the evidence
presented-for example, deciding what witnesses they believe and
don't believe and which party's story is more consistent with their understanding of reality. Recent psychological research indicates that as
jurors are presented with conflicting evidence in the courtroom, they
"resolve these conflicts by constructing a story which reflects what
they believe 'really happened."' 76 In deciding which story is more
credible, jurors use their experience of the world and their experience
as members of the community.' Their assessment of what they hear
and see, like all human cognition, is "mediated by the assumptions
73. There is a persistent, if subtle, tendency to associate female imagery with this
allegedly non-rational behavior of juries. See, eg., Edsun R. Sunderland, Verdicts,

General and Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253, 258 (1920) (asserting that juries are "as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle
of Delphi"); Olander, supra note 44, at 1089 (analogizing jury processes with "the veil

of secrecy"). See generally Gerald Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and Juries:
Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 Law & Ineq. J. 171, 181-85 (1986)
(discussing how female qualities are used to characterize juries).

74. See Marder, supra note 8, at 1052 (1995); see also ABA/Brookings Symposium,
Charting a Future for the Civil Jury System 9 (1992) ("[T]he standards used to resolve
disputes on public standards are based on the community's sense of justice."); Alexis
de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 272 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence
trans., 13th ed., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (1850) (discussing role of American jury);
Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the TraditionalCivil Jury: The Effects of Changes

in Composition and Procedures, in Verdict, supra note 49, at 414, 450 (stating that
legal concepts are not state of nature questions).
75. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the
Allocation of JudicialPower, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 47, 58-59 (1977); Marcus, supra note 8, at
782 (noting that the need to apply community standards makes a jury decision more
accurate than a decision by a judge); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullifica-

tion: The Contours of a Controversy, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1980, at 51, 69
("Civil jurors ...

must often decide how the parties ought to have acted, or how a

reasonable person would have acted, under the circumstances. This judgment requires a policy decision-not just an evaluation of the facts.").
76. Albert J. Moore, Trial by Sdema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37
UCLA L. Rev. 273, 284 (1989).
77. See generally W. Lance Bennett & Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality
in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture 162 (1981) (theorizing
that jurors use experience to evaluate evidence).
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and expectations [they] have about it. These assumptions or knowledge structures are used to filter, order, and interpret the world that
presents itself to [their] senses ....
[T]he jurors' prior assumptions
about the nature of the social world are an important ingredient of the
jury's verdict."7 Thus, juries do not use a linear model in which given
facts are applied element by element to a cause of action to make
decisions. Instead, the information presented to the jury will be "mediated through the subjective mental structures of the individual." 9
Researchers Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie studied jury
processes and learned that jurors, using stories as their models, reason
about the evidence and then try to match the accepted story with a
verdict category."0 Two principles, coverage"' and coherence, govern
whether jurors accept a story and how confident they feel about it. In
deciding whether a story is "coherent," one of the things that jurors
consider is whether it is plausible, that is, whether it is consistent with
the "decision-maker's knowledge about what typically happens in the
world."82 Another researcher has noted that a juror's "interpretive
schemata," their pre-existing structure for understanding experience,
influence how jurors select, store, recover, combine, and interpret
what they hear during the trial.8 3 A juror's life experience is thereby
made central to the decision-making process. Coherence analysis also
means that jurors consider whether a possible story is internally consistent and whether it is complete.8' This kind of decision-making requires a holistic analysis of the evidence and law.8 5 Empirical
researchers have demonstrated, in the context of other procedural devices, that when the trial is broken into separate parts, the jury is
thrown back onto less reliable heuristic devices in making its
decisions.8 6
78. Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-PositivistJury, 70 Ind. L.J. 405, 462

(1995).
79. Id. at 467; see also James A. Holstein, Jurors'Interpretationsand Jury Decision

Making, 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 83 (1985) (stating jurors' own mental filters affect
their understanding of evidence).
80. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 530-31 (1991) [hereinafter Pennington
& Hastie, Cognitive Theory]. For further examples of their work, see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. of
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 242 (1986); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical
Implications of PsychologicalResearch on Jurorand Jury Decision Making, 16 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 90 (1990).
81. "Coverage" of the evidence refers to the extent to which the story accounts for
all the evidence. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 80, at 527-28.
82. Id. at 528.
83. See Holstein, supra note 79, at 84-85.

84. See id.
85. See Granholm & Richards, supra note 72, at 542.
86. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation:
The Impact of ProceduralChanges on Jury Decisions, 73 Judicature 22, 27 (1989)
(studying the impact of different types of bifurcation on juries).
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What does all this imply for the jury charge? From a standpoint of
the jury as a political institution,' we need to analyze which kind of
jury charge format best enables the jury to bring its community values
and experience into the decision process.' This part examines the
general, broad form, and separate and distinct formats and their effects on the jury's political function.
The general charge facilitates all of the models of the jury as supplier of community values. To the extent that one sees jury nullification as legitimate, the general verdict appears to make that easier,
because the jury only has to understand who they want to win the case
(because they merely find for plaintiff or defendant). If the jury is
seen as the agent of mercy, the general charge allows the jurors to
factor their sympathies into their analysis.
The general charge is also well suited to the more subtle task of
including community values in the jury process. The general charge
allows the jury to consider the case as a whole. It gives the jurors
general instructions about evaluating evidence and about burden of
persuasion. It explains the relevant causes of action and defenses. It
gives the jury the ability to provide specific content to policy questions
such as "reasonableness." Then it leaves the jury to construct its
"story" and to consider how the whole story fits into the legal categories. So long as the instructions are not confusing, this format should
enable jurors to use their cognitive processes normally, and to use
them in a way that factors in the their underlying community values.
A special verdict format in broad form would create greater, but
perhaps not insurmountable, obstacles to the jury's political role. Jury
nullification would be a bit harder, as the jury would have to figure
out how to answer more specific questions to counteract the portion
of the law that they found to be unjust. For example, assume a state
that still applies the old doctrine of pure contributory negligence,
meaning even one percent of plaintiff negligence will result in no recovery. Assume further a jury that understands and rejects that legal
principle. That jury, with a broad form jury charge, would probably
be faced with a question like this:
Whose negligence, if any, proximately caused the occurrence in
question?
Defendant
Plaintiff
87. The question of which format best lends itself to "accurate" outcomes %Vill be
considered in part IV.A, infra.
88. See Haddon, supra note 8, at 87 (advocating for a jury process that involves
"authentic representation, meaningful communication, and deliberative accountability" and valuing the jury as representing the community's values). This also underscores the crucial importance of assuring that jury composition mirrors the diversity
of the community. Id. at 99-101; see sources cited supra note 8.
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The jury would have to realize that for plaintiff to receive any judgment, they would have to leave the "plaintiff" line blank, whatever
their view of the evidence. If they wanted to impose a kind of homegrown comparative negligence, they would have to reduce the amount
they found as the damage to plaintiff by the amount that they believed
resulted from the plaintiff's culpability. A jury's ability to make this
kind of response may depend in part on the leeway that lawyers are
given in making closing arguments and in part on the experience and
sophistication of the jurors. This format clearly makes jury nullification more difficult than the general verdict.
In the same way, the broad form charge may make more difficult
the jury's generalized role of counteracting situations in which the
strict application of the law would be unduly harsh. Again, the jury
would have to know how to adapt specific answers in order to achieve
the desired result.
The broad form charge is less likely to damage the jury's role in
applying community norms. As long as the questions retain general
legal definitions and are no narrower than one question per broad
legal theory,89 the process could remain sufficiently whole to allow the
jury to function. First, the jury would still make determinations such
as what kind of conduct is reasonable in light of all the facts. The
format would require the jury to consider each cause of action separately, but not in ways that compel logically related elements to be delinked. The format would be more harmful if the causes of action
functionally overlap, even though technically separate. For example,
both a negligence determination and a strict liability question may require consideration of foreseeable risk. A decision about whether a
product is fit for its customary use or for a particular purpose may
require similar considerations. Compartmentalizing the law application process must be done with care to avoid artificially limiting the
jury's ability to apply its understanding of the totality of the circumstances to each legal category.
Second, the charge would still allow the jury to use the cognitive
"story" process to evaluate the evidence as a whole and to apply the
relevant legal categories to that story. The broadly defined legal categories would not preclude consideration of certain stories or require
that the stories be pulled into separate pieces.
The separate and distinct special verdict format would cause the
most serious damage to the political role of the jury. Jury nullification
would become even more difficult because the jury would have to correctly answer a complex series of questions in order to achieve a desired result. Injecting situation-specific "mercy" in hard cases would
89. For example, in a negligence claim the question would include both primary
negligence and comparative negligence defenses, would include both breach and causation, and would not use "definitions" that were fact specific. See supra Part II.
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be similarly difficult. A series of separate and distinct questions
would also severely limit the jury's ability to apply community values.
The special verdict format is intended to change, or at least channel,
the jury's thought processes, to compel the jury to consider the case in
fragments, and to limit what the jury is allowed to consider. It is
meant to limit both its value-application and its fact-consideration
processes.
The general charge or broad form charges discussed above provide
the jury with general definitions of legal terms to apply. For example,
the jury is told that negligence means failure to use reasonable care
under the same or similar circumstances, and is then told to apply that
definition to the evidence. A separate and distinct format, however,
limits the circumstances that the jury is allowed to consider. The jury
will be asked -whether some specific act was negligent, and then
whether it was the cause of the injury.90 The jurors are not permitted
to consider all the circumstances, nor are they permitted to consider
the interaction of various allegedly negligent acts. For example, in a
car wreck case, the jury will be asked separately whether the defendant drove too fast, failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to yield the
right of way, etc. It will not be asked whether defendant drove negligently. They will also be required to think about the negligence of
specific acts separately from the issue of causation for each of those
acts; they will be asked to analyze causation separately as to each factual claim about negligence. This kind of narrow format, then, limits
the kind of community values that the jury is allowed to apply and the
way in which it is allowed to apply them. 91
If successful, the separate and distinct format also changes the jury's
fact determination process, and its ability to use its experience in evaluating the evidence. Rather than instructing the jury to consider
everything properly before it, the separate and distinct jury charge attempts to force the jury to decide particular factual questions in isolation from related factual questions. Thus the jurors' ability to use their
experience as members of the community in evaluating the evidence is
disrupted and the political influence of the lay person is minimized.
B. Limiting the Judge's Power
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the format of the
charge also affects the other political reason for the civil jury: the use
90. See, for example, the sample separate and distinct charge supra part It.

91. Combining specific questions with a general verdict, as permitted by Rule
49(b), does not solve the problem. Although the jury renders a general verdict in

addition to answering specific questions, the use of the questions may influence even
deliberation on the general verdict by isolating specific elements for separate consideration. And the specific interrogatories have all the same problems as the special
verdict in isolation. In addition, if the answers to the general verdict question conflict
with the answers to specific questions, the judgment is to be based on the interrogatory answers rather than the general verdict.
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of the jury as a limit on the power of the judge."2 As a part of democratic self-government, the jury is supposed to serve the people by
checking the judge "much as the legislature was to check the executive, the House to check the Senate, and the states to check the national government." 93 Early in the debate over the federal
constitution, for example, the jury's role of representing the people
was emphasized:
"Juries are constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the
people, and freemen of the country; and by holding the jury's right
to return a general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the people at large, their just and rightful controul [sic] in the judicial department."

. .

. [T]he democratic branch of the legislature and the

jury trial are the means of effective and popular control.94
It is therefore not surprising that many of our modern debates about
procedural devices are debates about the proper allocation of power
between the judge and the jury. The format of the jury charge also
makes an important difference in this power struggle.
Since about the sixteenth century, the law/fact distinction has been
a way to talk about the allocation of power between judges and juries.95 Any first year law student can recite that judges determine the
law and juries determine the facts. Behind this simple recitation, however, lie a myriad of possibilities and a continuum of real power. An
examination of the different jury charge formats illustrates the ways in
which different choices reallocate decision-making responsibility.
The general verdict format provides the greatest amount of control
to the jury, with the judge exercising comparatively less control. The
judge does explain fully the governing legal principles and so, in this
sense, the traditional explanation is correct. The judge does determine the law. But the process of law application,96 of applying the law
to the facts, is very much left in the hands of the jury. Within the
limits of the legal definitions, the jury is left to give content to legal
norms as applied to the particular case. In making this decision, the
jury is free to consider all admissible evidence and to make any reasonable inferences from that evidence. The jury can proceed with its
deliberations in any order that it chooses.
92. See Higginbotham, supra note 75, at 58 ("The jury serves as a check upon the
judge's power in each case.").
93. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1169, 1174 (1995); see also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 909, 999 (1987) ("The jury provides the counterforce of several lay people to
the single, powerful, trial judge.").
94. Yeazell, The New Jury, supra note 7, at 112-13 (citations omitted).
95. Weiner, supra note 50, at 1867.
96. See Louis, supra note 51, at 994-98 (discussing the law/fact distinction and
standard of review as methods of allocating power between trial and appellate
courts).
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The general verdict provides another kind of power to the jury: the
power not to explain its verdict. The ability to disclose a decision
without having to formally justify it is itself a kind of power, rather
like the parents' "because I said so." The right to return a general
verdict is, in fact, a historical source of conffict between juries and
judges, and the decision about what kind of verdict to return was originally within the control of the jury.97 As Justices Black and Douglas
stated:
One of the ancient, fundamental reasons for having general jury
verdicts was to preserve the right of trial by jury as an indispensable
part of a free government. Many of the most famous constitutional
controversies in England revolved around litigants' insistence, particularly in seditious libel cases, that a jury had the right to render a
general verdict without being compelled to return a number of subsidiary findings to support its general verdict. Some English jurors
had to go to jail because they insisted upon their right to render
general verdicts over the repeated commands of tyrannical judges
not to do so. 98
The broad form special verdict is again a kind of middle ground.
The judge, by using a charge format that requires the jury to focus on
each cause of action separately, exercises greater control over the
jury. The order of questions (although the jury can choose to ignore
it) also tends to give the judge greater control over the shape of the
deliberations. As long as the broad questions and definitions remain
fairly generic9 9 the jury retains the power to fill in community norms

and to freely apply the law to the facts.
The separate and distinct question format represents a more dramatic shift of control to the judge. While the jury is still determining
ultimate facts, its choices have been narrowed. They get to decide, for
example, whether John Doe failed to yield the right of way rather than
whether all things considered his driving was negligent. In choosing
what questions to ask, the judge is deciding in advance that some acts
can be alleged as negligent and that some cannot. The judge is also
deciding that each act should be considered in isolation rather than in
the context of other allegedly negligent acts.
Further, the judge strictly controls the order of deliberations."0 0
The separate and distinct format generally requires that numerous
questions be answered in order. Often, if a question is answered in a
97. See Dudnik, supra note 22, at 485-86 (suggesting that juries choose to make
specific fact findings to avoid personal punishment through attaint process).
98. Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas on the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Proposed Amendments, 31 F.R.D. 617, 618-19 (1963).
99. Compare a generic question with a general definition of product defect-for
example, "Do you find that the widget was defective?"-with a more specific approach-for example, "Do you find that the lack of a ZZ Device on the throttle made
the widget defective?"
100. For a fuffler example, see supra part II.
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particular way, the jurors will also be instructed not to answer some or
all of the remaining questions. Thus the judge controls to a much
greater extent the timing and extent of the jury's decision making
process.
The use of jury questions that ask only "historical fact" and leave
the judge to apply legal categories would be the most drastic shift of
all. To ask a jury only questions like "was the light red," "was the
road slippery," "how much would it cost to add a safety valve," and
the like would shift the balance of power even further toward the
judge and away from the jury. Although jurors would still have a
small role, and would still use their experience as members of the
community in deciding fact questions, their opportunity to make value
decisions would be almost completely eliminated.
It is also possible that common use of narrower questions would
tend to make courts think of fact finding as a collection of discrete
issues. This, in turn, may suggest to appellate courts more ways to
remove certain issues from the jury by (re)defining them as questions
of law rather than questions of fact. For example, in a tort case the
courts may choose certain threshold questions of duty' 0 ' or severity of
harm' 0 2 and decree that these are legal issues to be determined by the
court. Because the law/fact distinction has tended to be used as a label that justifies a decision rather than as a disciplined thought process. 1 3 the appellate courts would face few obstacles in adopting such
a practice. Thus a separate and distinct format practice might also
indirectly shift even more power away from the jury.
Shifts in power between judge and jury are sometimes thought of as
mere procedural devices. But like internal jury process, this, too, is a
political decision. In deciding between judge and jury we are choosing
to privilege one decision-maker over another.' 4
IV.

THE IMPACT OF CHARGE STRUCTURE ON PROCESS:
"ACCURACY" AND "EFFICIENCY"

In addition to its political role, the jury is also an important actor in
the judicial process. Advocates of the special verdict have argued that
101. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. 1993)
(requiring "extreme risk" as a matter of law before duty exists).
102. See, e.g., Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 626 n.21 (Tex. 1993) (defining
existence of extreme and outrageous behavior as a question of law (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 46, cmt. h (1965))).
103. Having converted an issue to a question of law, the jury will be removed from
the decisionmaking process completely and the appellate court can review the trial
court's decision de novo. This practice would therefore also cause a shift of power
from the trial courts to the appellate courts.
104. At the time the Constitution was being debated, for example, the Antifederalists believed that judges would naturally favor litigants that were part of the ruling
elite. See Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, JudicialAssessment of Punitive Damages, the
Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 152-53
(1991).
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the narrower question formats will improve both the accuracy and the
efficiency of the jury process. This part examines these claims.
A. More Guided, More Accurate?
Jurors are the ones who are supposed to determine evidentiary and
ultimate fact: what happened, and what does it mean? Various philosophical schools have different views about what the jury is actually
doing here. Some, which see historical fact as having a kind of verifiable and independent existence, see the jury's role as scientific: to
reach a determination of the facts that matches as closely as possible
that external reality. The jury then takes its understanding of factual
events and applies certain legal concepts, defined by the judge, and
reaches a verdict. Professor Wells describes this "impersonal" model
of jury deliberation as "simply a matter of recognizing the case, selecting the appropriate major premise, and mechanically performing the
syllogistic act of judgment."'10 5 For people who take this view, a case
is accurately decided if it "is the result of employing an approved rule
or principle." 106
Others see the jury's decisional process as more intuitive or contextual. Under this view, the kinds of general principles that determine
the proper outcome of a case are not "universal rules that link factual
antecedents to normative conclusions; they are simply generalizations
of normative attitudes toward a particular context."' 07 The jury uses
its experience to reconcile conflicting testimony, apply its sense of
community values to the legal principles, and reach a contextual judgment. The "accuracy" of the jury's verdict in this theory depends on
the integrity of the jury's deliberative process. For either school of
thought, the form of the jury charge has important implications for the
"accuracy" of the jury's result.
These theories, unfortunately, operate in an empirical vacuum.
There is little or no evidence regarding how "accurate" juries' verdicts
are compared to some kind of outwardly verifiable reality." More to
105. Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A PragmaticJustificationforJuryAdjudication,88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348, 2378 (1990). For another analysis of
the role of community standards in decisionmaking, see Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1313 (1994).
106. Wells, supra note 105, at 2382. Another way of explaining the function of the
jury, under this view, is: "[F]irst, the jury determines the fact that defendant did x;
second, the judge provides a rule such as 'x gives rise to tort liability'; and third, the
jury, possessing both a fact and a rule, mechanically draws the conclusion that the
defendant is liable for damages." Id at 2387.
107. Id at 2379.
108. Anecdotal evidence exists of particular juries doing things that people regard
as irrational, some of which is apocryphal and some of which is later shown to be
perfectly rational. See, e.g., Climbig on Board, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 12 (describing
apocryphal but oft-repeated story of "frivolous litigation"). No real or simulated
studies exist, as far as I know, that are able to match jury verdicts against stipulated
facts and legal conclusions.

1868

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the point, there is no evidence linking jury accuracy to any particular
instruction format. We are therefore left with the need to theorize
based on what we do know.
Despite the popular tendency to disparage juries, the empirical evidence that does exist indicates that juries do a good job at an inherently complex and difficult task. "[T]here is a mounting body of
evidence suggesting that accounts of jury irrationality were greatly exaggerated."' 1 9 One way in which researchers have tried to measure
the accuracy of jury results is to compare jury verdicts to the decision
a judge would have made in the same case. For example, the University of Chicago jury project found that in civil cases judges and juries
agreed on liability in seventy-nine percent of the cases. 110 This compares favorably with the rate of agreement among people making similarly complex decisions."' In addition, we can't assume that any
difference between judge and jury reflects error on the jury's part.
Some have attributed the disagreement that does exist more to "the
109. Galanter, The Civil Jury, supra note 6, at 206; see Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 49-71 (1986); Rita J. Simon, The Jury: Its Role in American
Society 49-71 (1980); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 1151-52 (comparing judge and jury outcomes); Neil Vidmar, The Unfair Criticism of Medical Malpractice Juries, 76 Judicature 118, 124 (1992) ("In summary, aggregate empirical
evidence drawn from multiple sources lends no support to claims that juries are consistently pro-plaintiff, incompetent, or deliver unjustifiably generous awards.").
110. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1055, 1065
(1964).
111. Shari Diamond compiled for comparison a set of representative studies of consistency among judges faced with complex clinical judgments in individual cases
where the decisionmaker had to "evaluate and combine incomplete or potentially
unreliable information to reach a decision." See Galanter, The Civil Jury, supra note
6, at 215 n.73 (quoting Shari Seidman Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in
Criminal-CourtDecisions, in Psychology and the Law 119, 124-25 (C. James Scheirer
& Barbara L. Hammonds eds., 1983)). She found the following:
Interjudge Consistency in Complex Human Judgments

Decision makers
NSF versus NAS peer
reviewers
7 employment interviewers

Stimulus
150 grant proposals
submitted to NSF
10 job applicants

Decision
To fund or not to fund (half
funded by NSF)
Ranked in top 5 or in

Rate of
agreement
between 2
judges (%)
75
70

bottom 5
4 experienced psychiatrists

153 patients interviewed

Psychosis, neurosis,

twice, once by each of two

character disorder

psychiatrists
3 patient-actors with

Diagnosis: correct or

presenting symptoms

incorrect

(Doctors could request

Probability of agreement

further information and

(both correct or both

3576 judge-jury pairs

receive test results.)
3576 jury trials

incorrect)
Guilty or not guilty

78

12 federal judges

460 presentence reports (at

Custody or no custody

80

Custody or no custody

79

21-23 practicing physicians

8 federal judges

67,77,70
55,65,57

sentencing council)

439 presentence reports (at
sentencing council)

Id. (footnotes omitted).
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jury's sense of equity" than to its relative competence.' 12 Whenever
the relevant legal standards require the jury to give content to general
expressions of policy, the jury may be the superior decision-maker:
"[T]he need to apply community standards makes a jury decision in a
real sense more accurate than a decision by a judge."' 3 One commentator, reflecting on the lack of juries in personal injury cases in
Britain, argued that the jury's award of damages would actually be
more accurate:
The appreciation of pain and suffering, and the likely impact on an
individual's life and his or her ability to earn a living, are not matters which judges are any more qualified to assess than is a member
of the public applying his or her life experience. Some might argue
that the experience of ordinary people in such4 an assessment is a
great deal more relevant than that of judges.1
The question, then, is not whether a different form of jury charge
would rescue a dysfunctional institution. Rather, it is whether a different format would make a fairly reliable decision-maker even better.
Consider first the perspective of those who believe the jury to be attempting to accurately determine the nature and legal significance of
past events by mechanically applying legal rules. We can think about
increased accuracy in two ways: (1) whether a narrower charge will
increase the agreement between judge and jury, assuming that the
judge is more apt to be correct;" 5 or (2) whether a narrower charge
will be less confusing, so that jurors are better able to understand and
apply the law.
If the measure of jury accuracy is agreement with the trial judge,
charge formats that give the judge more control of the content and
order of deliberations may increase accuracy in that sense. If the
judge can structure the charge in a way that prevents the jury from
considering factors (for example, sympathy with a party) that the
judge would not have considered, then that charge format may be able
to increase judge/jury agreement." 6 If the judge can structure the
charge so that the law application process is removed from the jury, as
in Professor Saltzburg's "did defendant run a red light" hypothetical,
then the judge will have greater power over the ultimate case outcome
112. Kalven, supra note 110, at 1065-66.
113. Marcus, supra note 8, at 782 ("[T]welve men know more of the common affairs
of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge." (quoting Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873))).
114. Peter Watson, The Search for Justice-A Case for Reform to the Civil Justice
System in Britain, 2 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 453, 457 (1996).
115. This assumption, of course, is questionable. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
116. As noted supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text, separate and distinct format will make it far more difficult for juries who want a particular party to win, or
who wish to reach a non-legal but "just" result, to answer the questions so as to
achieve the outcome they desire.
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It seems odd, however, to

require a jury for its uniquely democratic value, and then measure its
accuracy by comparing it to the decisions of a judge.
Perhaps it is more helpful to look at the issue of jury confusion. A
conscientious jury that does not understand how to read and apply its
instructions is hampered in its ability to reach an accurate verdict.
Are special verdicts by nature less confusing? Some commentators
believe that the narrow, step-by-step nature of the special verdict is

easier for jurors to deal with than the general verdict's long narrative
explanation followed by a single question.' 1 8 This may or may not be
true as applied to particular charges, but it seems unlikely that special
verdicts as a class will be less confusing. This is true for a number of

reasons.
First, there is no reason to believe that the language or structure of
individual questions will be any clearer than that of the general
charge.'1 9 In fact, the need to word questions so as to correctly place
the burden of proof and to avoid assuming controverted facts may
actually tend to make the wording of some questions somewhat convoluted and harder to understand. 12 °
The claim for greater clarity, then, must be that it is the fractionalization itself that makes the charge more understandable by breaking
a large decision down into smaller, ordered parts. There is some intuitive appeal to this idea. The claim is a problematic one, however.
There are other ways to suggest a manageable thought process to jurors without breaking the jury's answer process into artificial segments. 121 This also assumes that the questions themselves and their
relation to each other will be clearer than the narrative. As noted
117. This decision, of course, would work a dramatic change in the role of the jury
as we know it, but it would increase the judge's power to determine the outcome of a
case tried to a jury.
118. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 49, at 360 (stating special verdicts focus on facts
and are easier for jurors to understand); Robert W. Stayton, Texas' Approach to the
Parker Ideal and Her Shortcomings, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 845, 855 (1959) (stating special
verdicts are less perplexing guides to juries).
119. Both can be written in ways that increase or decrease a jury's ability to understand them. Various improvements in word choice, sentence length, sentence structure, and syntax can improve juror understanding. See Elwork et al., supra note 9, at
165-69; Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 37, 46-52 (1993). In addition, comprehension can improve if each juror is
given written copies of the charge, rather than merely reading the charge to the jury
orally. See Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury 231 (1983). This, too, can be done with
either a general or special charge.
120. For an example, see questions in the sample "separate and distinct" charge in
supra part II. For a general discussion of the systemic forces that tend to cause judges
to write jury instructions that are hard to understand, see Walter W. Steele, Jr. &
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67
N.C. L. Rev. 77, 98-105 (1988).
121. See Christopher N. May, "What Do We Do Now?": Helping Juries Apply the
Instructions,28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 869, 884-86 (1995) (recommending specific sequential instructions).
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above, that is not necessarily the case. More fundamentally, separate
questions may try to force the jurors into an unnatural kind of pattern
of deliberations that actually adds to the confusion.'22
There is a second reason to doubt that special verdicts will increase
accuracy by decreasing confusion. As long as jurors determine "ultimate facts," they still need to understand and apply legal definitions
and instructions. Those commentators who believe that special verdicts eliminate the need for the jury to be instructed in the law simply
misunderstand the nature of that type of charge. For example, even
Ward Cleaver's simple products liability case used as an example
above will require the jury to be instructed as to the meaning of negligence, proximate cause, producing cause, defect, and other legal
terms. These instructions are not made any simpler by virtue of being
placed in a restricted factual context or by being included in a question. The empirical research on juror comprehension of instructions
has tested these very legal definitions and shown that they can cause
confusion."2 The need for these definitions does not go away just
because a special verdict is used.
Third, in cases in which evidence or legal theories overlap, special
verdicts may decrease rather than increase accuracy. "Proponents of
the special verdict pay insufficient deference to the interrelationship
among trial issues such as negligence, causation and damages. No issue can be fairly or justly decided in a vacuum."' -4 Although lawyers
have provided separate labels for the concepts, in a real case questions
such as whether defendant acted reasonably, whether its actions
caused, in a direct enough way, foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, and
how the plaintiff's own actions contributed to the whole incident are
not truly separate questions from the standpoint of law application.
None of these questions can be rationally decided in the absence of
the others; forcing separate answers could hurt rather than help the
jury's ability to have its verdict reflect its understanding of the facts
and the parties' failure to act appropriately.'2
A fourth reason to disbelieve that special verdicts lead to improved
clarity and accuracy is the experience of Texas, a state that has used
the special verdict procedure for decades. 2 6 The case reporters are
122. See sources cited supra notes 76-86. The same problem occurs when the specific questions accompany a general verdict as permitted by Rule 49(b).

123. See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supra note 9, at 1311 (describing research on
juror comprehension of instructions); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 120, at 88-92

(same).
124. Granholm & Richards, supra note 72, at 531.
125. Note, for example, that Pennington, Penrod, and Hastie's study reported that

during jury deliberations "[a] substantial proportion of the discussion made simultaneous reference to both facts and legal issues." Hastie et al., supra note 119, at 97.

126. Federal experience would also tend to make one skeptical that either the Rule
49(a) special verdicts or the Rule 49(b) general verdict accompanied by interrogato-

ries improves juror comprehension, and thereby improves accuracy. See, for exam-
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full of cases in which jurors failed to understand their instructions,
despite the most fractionalized system of jury submission in
America. 2 7 In fact, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that juror understanding was not the point: "[I]t would be most
unrealistic to expect that all members of the jury as ordinary laymen
would thoroughly understand every portion of a complicated
charge.... Most of our jury verdicts would be128of little value" if juror
misunderstanding were grounds for new trial.
In summary, there appears to be no evidence that special verdict
formats will improve the accuracy of the jury decision- making process
when accuracy is defined as the correspondence between the verdict
and technical legal rules applied to objective historical fact. Special
verdicts are subject to the same kind of linguistic difficulties as the
general verdict, with some additional problems of their own. They do
pie, the cases cited for internally inconsistent verdicts in Martin, supra note 14, at 70004 nn.56-72.
127. See, e.g., Stephens County Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257,260 (Tex.
1974) (jurors misunderstood judge's charge regarding "undue influence"); Compton
v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tex. 1963) (juror confused reasonable doubt standard
with preponderance of evidence standard); Martin v. United States Trust Co., 690
S.W.2d 300, 309 (Tex. App. 1985) (jurors misunderstood judge's charge regarding
"undue influence"); Hoffman v. Deck Masters, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Tex. App.
1983) (jurors misunderstood damage instruction); Cortez v. Medical Protective Co. of
Fort Wayne, Ind., 560 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (jurors inferred "consent" in disregard of court's instructions); Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d
797, 803-04 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (juror stated his erroneous interpretation of court's
charge to other juror); Coakley v. Crow, 457 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
(jurors did not understand and wrongfully applied the definition of actual notice contained in court's charge). Because for a long time Texas permitted parties to introduce evidence of conversations in the jury room (as distinct from juror "mental
processes"), there is a substantial body of case law demonstrating the jurors' misunderstanding of the jury charge. See Jack Pope, The Mental Operations of Jurors, 40
Tex. L. Rev. 849, 851-52 (1962). This, combined with the Texas special verdict practice, makes it a good source of empirical evidence regarding the impact of the special
verdict. It must be noted, though, that Texas took special verdict practice to an extreme that is permitted but not required by Rule 49(a). Even today, when the practice has been substantially liberalized, it requires whole books to explain in detail
what the questions should be like, what the instructions should be like, how to preserve error, what to do with omissions, what to do with apparent conflicts, and the
like. See Hodges & Guy, supra note 35 (the successor to Gus M. Hodges, Special Issue
Submission in Texas (1959), which was the practitioner's Bible in this inscrutable area
for years).
128. Whited v. Powell, 285 S.W.2d 364, 367-68 (Tex. 1956). In Whited, the jury was
asked "whether the defendant discovered that plaintiffs were in a position of peril
within such time and distance that by the exercise of ordinary care and the use of all
means at his hand consistent with the safety of himself, his passenger and his automobile, he [defendant] could have avoided the collision in question." Id. at 365. During
deliberations one juror opined to the others that this question required a finding of
deliberate misconduct: "We can't answer that 'Yes'; if we do it will be saying this boy
is the same as a murderer. I won't vote to make a criminal of the boy." Id. Another
juror, based upon the erroneous statement by the first juror, changed his vote. The
Texas Supreme Court categorized this as "express misconstruction of the court's
charge" but held that such misunderstanding is not grounds for new trial. Id. at 367.
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not eliminate the problem of explaining complex legal concepts to lay
jurors. And they may, by interfering with jurors' natural method of
processing complicated information, actually decrease accuracy of
results.
What if commentators with a different view of the jury's role are
correct, and the jury's job is to make a holistic assessment of the way
that community standards apply to the conflicting stories and interrelated events that are presented to the jury? Here the question of accuracy is not the ability to reconstruct some external reality but the
ability to use the jurors' collective experience of life as members of
the community to determine a just outcome:
Concepts such as negligence, foreseeability, prudence, due care, and
the "reasonable person," are not simply state of nature questions.
Rather, they involve a number of complex decisions about a variety
of matters: who did what; interpretations of how human beings be-

have or should behave; what is reasonable to expect others to do or
not do; and what motivations lead to what types of behavior. They
also involve judgments about the consequences of deciding a case
one way or the other-for example, who will be helped or harmed
or what types of12 behavior
will be encouraged or discouraged by cer9
tain outcomes.

If this is what the jury is doing, then charge format is still important.
The general verdict allows the jury to consider the evidence and law as
a whole. Other than explaining the applicable legal doctrines, the
general verdict does not structurally emphasize certain theories or
limit the jury's deliberations. Special verdicts, on the other hand, are
specifically designed to focus and control the jury, to limit what can be
considered, to isolate certain issues from other issues, and to control
the sequence of deliberation. If reality is socially constructed and jurors arrive at their understanding by using their community experience, and if the application of many legal standards depends on the
derivation and application of community standards, special verdicts
seem likely to interfere wvith the process.13 Therefore, they would
make jury decision-making less accurate in this sense; the narrower
the questions,
the more obstacles, and the less "accurate" the
3
outcome.' '
129. Casper, supra note 74, at 450.
130. See Marcus, supra note 8, at 782 (stating that the application of laws that incorporate community standards require consideration and understanding of a wide variety of circumstances, including those giving rise to the out of court event that
precipitates the litigation).
131. This "process" issue is necessarily related to the "political function" issue discussed above. A system of jury submission that increases the jury's power to decide
how to decide naturally increases the power of the jury. By doing so it increases the
power of lay people in the community as compared to the legal professionals. One
might fear that this view of the jury system will result in unpredictable results. This
will only be true if juries in a community tend to vary widely in their understanding of
community standards. Even if it does increase uncertainty, "as normative proposi-
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More Narrow, More Efficient?

Proponents of narrower jury instruction formats believe that the
special verdict is more efficient. In other words, they claim that the
special verdict saves time at both the trial and appellate levels. This
section of the article examines whether special verdict formats are
likely to result in decreased transaction costs.
1. Trial Court-Initial Trial
Narrower special verdicts could be more efficient at the trial court
level if they either save time or decrease the need for re-trials. Some
special verdict proponents make this claim.' 3 2 A careful look at the
task of constructing and applying special verdicts, however, shows that
this outcome is unlikely, both from the standpoint of the jury and the
trial judge.
a.

The Jurors' Perspective

From the jurors' point of view, the special verdict would be more
efficient if it were easier to understand and therefore led to quicker
deliberations. As discussed above, there is no reason to believe that
this is true.'3 3 The special verdict format is not inherently clearer than
the general verdict. On the contrary, a special verdict in a separate
and distinct format may actually conflict with a jury's normal thought
processes and be more difficult to understand. Thus, the special verdict is unlikely to lead to faster or more accurate verdicts than would a
clearly drafted general verdict. Commentators in fact believe that the
special verdict may
actually be more difficult for the jury and more
34
consuming.1
time
There is one circumstance in which a special verdict could save time
at the trial level. If one clearly separable question could, if answered
in a particular way, eliminate the need for any other questions to be
considered, it could shorten the deliberations. For example, a defense
of accord and satisfaction 1 35 might appropriately be submitted as a
tions, rationality and predictability are not the only goals of the civil justice system.
The sense of justice that emerges from the community is also critical to a civil justice
system that is likely to endure and produce outcomes acceptable to the community at
large." Casper, supra note 74, at 451.
132. See Dudnik, supra note 22, at 491 (citing arguments made by special verdict
proponents).
133. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
134. See Devitt et al., supra note 21, § 6.03 ("[T]he use of special verdicts is not a
panacea for the defects of the general verdict."); Driver, supra note 23, at 24-25 ("Juries seem to have more trouble reaching an agreement on special verdicts."). Note
also that the general verdict accompanied by interrogatories by its very nature requires questions to be answered more than once, which seems likely to increase the
time required for deliberations.
135. Accord and satisfaction is defined as "compromise and settlement." See Bryan
A. Garner, Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 15 (1995) ("An accord is an agreement
to substitute for an existing debt or obligation some alternative form of discharging
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separate question at the beginning of the charge. If the defense is
factually separate from the other claims and defenses and has support
in the evidence, a defense answer to this question might eliminate the
need for the jury to answer the remaining questions.
Such a strategy, however, would be inadvisable for two reasons.
First, there are few issues that should be selected for such prominent
treatment. Most potentially dispositive issues will be affirmative defenses. They are likely to be factually intertwined with other issues,
making their isolation unsuitable for accurate decision making. 1a The
judge would also need to take care not to draw inappropriate attention to a particular issue by pulling it out of order and highlighting its
impact.
Second, it might turn out to be inefficient when considered in light
of both trial and appeal. Suppose the judge did instruct the jury to
stop after finding accord and satisfaction without answering the other
questions. If that question turns out to be improper for any reasonlegally inapplicable, incorrectly worded, or insufficiently supported by
the evidence-the entire case would have to be retried. If, however,
the trial judge had instructed the jury to answer all the questions
whatever their response to the accord and satisfaction question, a
judgment could be entered based on the jury's other responses and a
retrial would be unnecessary. Therefore, it would be unwise for trial
courts to dismiss juries based on their answers to potentially dispositive introductory questions. Accordingly, the time saving is severely
minimized.
b. The Judge's Perspective
From the trial judge's point of view, a special verdict would be more
efficient if it were easier to draft or led to a greater number of judgments. This also seems unlikely. Drafting both general and special
verdicts requires the trial judge to correctly identify and understand
the legal theories involved in a case, the way in which those theories
interact, and the relationship between the theories and the facts alleged. Both general and special verdicts require the judge to correctly
define relevant legal terms, whether well established or cutting edge.
Both general and special verdicts require the judge to decide whether
the parties have met their burdens of production to send issues to the
jury. Is there nevertheless something about the special verdict that
makes it easier to draft?
No. On the contrary, the special verdict introduces several new
kinds of technical issues into the jury charge process. First, drafting a
that debt; a satisfaction is the actual discharge of the debt by the substituted
means.... Any claim ... may be discharged by an accord and satisfaction.") (emphases omitted).
136. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text; see also Dudnik. supra note 22,

at 495 n.50 (discussing interrelationship of jury's answers on different issues).
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series of questions is at least as hard as drafting a narrative explanation of the law. It is likely to be harder because the judge must draft
carefully in order to correctly place the burden of proof and to avoid
assuming disputed facts. The judge in drafting a special verdict must
also cope with the question of which definitions are necessary 137 and
where they should be placed in relation to the questions. And at least

at the federal level, there are no handy form books to use as an aid in
drafting; the judge's only starting points would be partisan requested
charges prepared by the parties.
Once the jury responds to the special verdict questions, a number of
problems may arise which do not occur with the general verdict. First,
multiple answers mean multiple chances for answers to conflict.' 38
The trial judge must deal with this conflict and decide whether to ignore it (conflict immaterial) or send the case back to the jury (conflict
material but fixable). 139 In some cases, the jury may not be able to
resolve the conflict, or the existence of conflicting answers may not
become clear until after the jury has been dismissed, and a new trial
will be required. Second, the jury may omit certain answers.' 40 The
judge must decide whether the omissions are material and what to do

about them.
All of these are new technical difficulties created by the special ver-

dict format. If they bring to light confusion that always exists but is
masked by the general verdict, the special verdict might allow a new
opportunity for the judge to cure the jurors' confusion. 14 1 If the new
conflicts result from new confusion created by the special verdict for-

mat itself, they have1 42made the jury deliberation process less rather
than more efficient.

137. See, e.g., Hodges & Guy, supra note 35, §§ 17, 20, 24 (reviewing definitions of
legal or technical terms, instructions that "tilt" or "nudge" jury, general considerations in the drafting and placement of jury instructions).
138. This is also true of the general verdict with interrogatories, the structure of
which actually requires the jury to answer the same question multiple times and therefore maximizes the potential for answers which conflict internally. Other types of
charges, absent inferential rebuttal questions, would ask each question once if properly drafted.
139. See John R. Brown, FederalSpecial Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator,44 F.R.D.
338, 350; see also Dudnik, supra note 22, at 511-13 (noting the intricate problems of
reconciling answers).
140. Despite instructions to the contrary, juries do leave questions unanswered. See
Hodges & Guy, supra note 35, § 122; Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2510.
141. In at least some jurisdictions, however, the judge clarifies at his peril, because
the appellate court might reverse the case if it finds that the judge's further instructions were a comment on the weight of the evidence. For such a case, see Teaney v.
City of St. Joseph, 548 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
142. Current case law provides some evidence that the federal courts already have
problems dealing with the technical aspects of special verdicts, even when they are
infrequently used. For example, federal courts are confused about the difference between a special verdict under Rule 49(a) and a general verdict with interrogatories
under Rule 49(b). See Brown, supra note 139, at 339-40; Wright & Miller, supra note
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2. Court of Appeals
We must also examine whether narrower special verdict format is
more efficient at the court of appeals level. We should therefore consider whether the appeal of a judgment based on a special verdict
would help conserve the resources of the appellate courts. 113 This
could occur if the special verdict format isolated issues factually or
legally, thereby allowing the reviewing court to limit its consideration
of the record or of the legal issues raised by the parties.'"
In a lawsuit involving a single legal and factual theory, the special
verdict would be virtually indistinguishable from the general verdict.
It is in cases involving multiple claims and defenses that efficiency
gains might theoretically exist. When one considers the entirety of the
appellate decisionmaking process,14however,
the gains at the appellate
5
level prove to be largely illusory.
One kind of error involving the charge is an error in the wording of
the charge itself. This can occur either in the general verdict or special
verdict format. 146 It is not likely to be either easier or harder to isolate those issues based on the number of questions asked of jurors.
Nor will the question of whether an error was harmful be less complex. General verdict or special verdict, the court of appeals will need
to look at the flawed portion of the charge in context to decide
whether it had a tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect
to the applicable principles of law. 147 An analysis of harmfulness will
require, at minimum, the error to be considered in light of the charge
as a whole,"4 whether the charge is constructed as a general verdict or
special verdict. If a decision about harmfulness requires a review of
the record, 49 the same amount of record will need to be reviewed
whether the charge was general or special.
14, § 2501, at 151 n.1. Federal courts are also inconsistent in their treatment of conflicting answers and the requirements for preservation of error. Id. §§ 2508, 2510.
143. For information on appellate caseloads, see generally Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics (1993) (providing statistics for
federal courts); Conference of State Court Admins. et al., State Court Caseload Statistics, 1994 (1995) (providing statistics for state courts).
144. There might also be a time saving from the perspective of a decreased need to
remand. Because this actually impacts the trial court, it is discussed in part IV.B.3,

infra.

145. See Nordbye, supra note 29, at 684 ("[T]he history of [special verdict] practice
in the [s]tates which have followed it [shows that] reversals and mistrials... appear to
be fully as many as in trials where a general verdict is returned.").
146. As discussed above, this may be even more likely in the more technical special
verdict format.
147. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2558.
148. The court of appeals examines the error in the charge in light of the charge as
a whole to determine whether there is reversible error. See id.
149. Occasionally, federal courts are willing to examine more than just the charge
itself in order to determine whether the error was harmless. This could occur, for
example, if the erroneous portion of the charge concerns an issue that played a very
minor role at trial or if the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the verdict. See id.
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Another kind of challenge on appeal focuses on the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury's findings. There may be an allegation on appeal that one of the claims was supported by so little evidence that the jury's verdict was clearly erroneous. Appellate review
of this type of claim requires the court to consider the evidence offered that is relevant to that issue. This, too, is true whether the jury
charge is in broad or narrow format.
There is, however, a possibility that a special verdict might occasionally reduce appellate workload by eliminating an issue entirely. In
a multiple theory case submitted to the jury with a general verdict, the
jury's answer does not provide complete information as to the basis
for its findings. For example, in a case in which plaintiff has three
theories of recovery, a pro-plaintiff verdict tells us that the jury found
that plaintiff proved at least one of her claims. The jury might have
believed one, two, or all three of the claims; we just don't know. Suppose that one of the claims was not adequately supported in the evidence but the other two were, or that one claim was incorrectly stated
but the other two were legally correct. With a general verdict, the
court of appeals will not know whether the jury's verdict was based on
the questionable theory. The court might therefore have to take the
time to consider that issue on appeal. 5 '
With a special verdict, however, it is possible that the verdict form
would demonstrate conclusively that the jury did not find for plaintiff
on the flawed theory, or that such a finding was immaterial because
the jury also found for plaintiff on an independent and error-free theory. If either of the latter situations exists, the problematic claim
would not be raised on appeal because it would not have the capacity
to result in reversal. 5 ' This would result, therefore, in a time saving
for the judges on the court of appeals.
Note, however, that this assumes that the theories are so unrelated
that there can be an issue of law or evidentiary sufficiency that affects
only one of them. This seems likely to happen only in situations in
which multiple theories are based on quite different facts, or when one
claim has a unique element that is neither legally nor factually related
to the other theories (and the unique element is the problematic one).
It is less likely to occur in a situation such as a product liability case in
which plaintiff has factually-related
claims based on different but
152
overlapping legal theories.
150. See infra part IV.B.3 for a discussion of whether an error needs to be considered when other parts of the charge are legally correct and supported by sufficient
evidence.
151. A variant on this situation would occur when multiple issues are raised by
appellant but the court's disposition of some issues demonstrates the existence of an
error-free theory that provides a ground for affirmance and makes the other issues
immaterial.
152. For example, in a products liability case such as the Cleaver hypothetical, the
same or similar facts will be relevant to the negligence claims, the strict liability
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3. Trial Court-Necessity for Remand 15 3
Another possible efficiency gain could come in a decreased need for
new trials following initial trial error. Proponents of the special verdict argue that the special verdict may demonstrate the harmlessness
of certain trial errors and thereby reduce the need to remand cases for
new trial."5 The fragmented nature of the special verdict means that
these scholars are correct in predicting the greater ability to isolate
issues than with the general verdict. As noted above, this kind of
analysis would be proper only when issues are truly separate, and not
merely when it is possible to write a question that states an element as
a separate issue.' 5 The argument also assumes the need for remand
in general verdict cases. This reflects a policy choice rather than an
empirical necessity, and requires further examination."5 6
In multiple-theory general verdict cases, an error that infects less
than all of a party's theories leaves the appellate court faced with imperfect knowledge. The error may have affected the verdict; it may
not have affected the verdict. The verdict may have been based on the
flawed theory, or it may have been based on other parts of the case.
By the time the error comes to light, the jury has been dismissed.
Even if we could find the jurors and question them, the rules of evidence prohibit examining them about their deliberations. 1 The
court of appeals is therefore forced to make a policy decision rather
than an empirical one. The court must weigh its desire for a correct
outcome against its concerns about the expense of retrial.
Automatic remand of the whole case is not the only procedural option. The court can reverse and remand all general verdicts containing
an error, because there is the possibility that the error infected the
verdict. It can affirm all cases in which there remains at least one
theory that is correctly stated and supported with sufficient evidence,
because that error-free theory could support a verdict. Or it could do
claims, and the breach of warranty claim. Similarly, the legal concepts of breach of
duty in the negligence claim; the comparison of risk and utility in the strict liability

claim; and the warranty question of whether a product was fit for the ordinary purpose for which that product is used are all functionally related. It seems unlikely in

such a situation that a problematic issue will uniquely affect one claim.

153. I am indebted to my colleague Bill Dorsaneo for raising and discussing with
me the issue of appellate disposition of partially flawed jury cases, and for sharing
with me his case file on standard of review. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Broad-Form
Submission of Jury Questions and the Standardof Review, 46 SMU L Rev. 601 (1992).
154. See Brown, supra note 139, at 341-42; Wright, supra note 19, at 202.
155. See supra Part IV.B.2.

156. This also leaves aside for now the question of weighing an efficiency gain from
fewer remands against the other policy considerations involved in decisions about the
jury charge.

157. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Studies have also shown that juror accounts of their own
behavior are not completely reliable. See Robert G. Nieland, Pattern Jury Instructions: A Critical Look at a Modern Movement to Improve the Jury System 24-25

(1979).
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something in between. If efficiency is our concern, we can reduce the
number of remands by changing the standard of review, whatever the
form of the charge. Once this decision has been made, it is only eliminating some of the remands that remain that will allow verdict format
to create additional efficiency gains.
The problem is best considered from the standpoint of the trial
judge who is about to make a decision about verdict format. The
judge will need to ask herself whether that particular case is the type
in which the special verdict has a strong potential for generating remand-related time saving. In order to consider this problem concretely, assume a lawsuit in which plaintiff has three claims: A, B, and
C. Assume further that all three claims were submitted to the jury in
general verdict format and that the jury found for plaintiff. We will
examine various possible flaws in Claim B'5 8 and consider whether
error is likely to require a remand of the entire case.
First, suppose that the charge misstates the law creating Claim B in
a significant way, either by erroneously explaining established law or
by including a "cutting edge" claim that the court of appeals rejects.
Claims A and C are correctly explained and all claims are supported
by sufficient evidence, although the record would support a verdict for
either plaintiff or defendant. Should the court of appeals reverse and
remand? It is at least possible that the jury relied only on the misstated Claim B in rendering its verdict. Because the jurors are lay
people, we have no reason to believe that they had the capacity to
correct the judge's misstatement of the law and they would in any case
have been instructed to follow the court's explanations of the law.
Further, the jurors will have been presented with evidence supporting
this flawed claim. There is, therefore, nothing in the record to minimize the likelihood that the jurors relied on Claim B. The risk that
the error harmed the defendant may thus be too great to ignore, and a
remand of the whole case may be required.' 5 9
Under these circumstances, a broad form special verdict in which
Claims A, B, and C are submitted to the jury separately 6 0 would be
more efficient. If the jury does not find for plaintiff on Claim B, the
issue will not even be raised on appeal. If the jury found for plaintiff
on Claim B, but also found for plaintiff on flawless Claim A and/or
Claim C, the court of appeals can affirm the case because the error in
Claim B will be harmless. In either case, a remand will be avoided
158. Assume further that the identified flaw in Claim B is the only error alleged.
159. On the other hand, the court of appeals could value efficiency more highly
even in general verdict cases. It might decide that as long as an error-free theory
supporting the verdict can be traced though the pleadings, evidence, and jury charge,
the case should be affirmed. A court system taking this position would affirm the case
with legally flawed Claim B, and the special verdict would not create efficiency gains.
Reversal would be required only when harmful error existed as to each theory that
could support the verdict.
160. See, for example, the sample charge, supra part II.
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because separate submission of the flawed claim demonstrates that
the legal error did not play a part in the jury's verdict. In a system
with this attitude about remand, a multi-theory case with a claim
known to be problematic creates possible efficiency gains from the use
of a special verdict.
What about a multiple-theory case with a different type of error?
Suppose the problem with Claim B is the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the jury's pro-plaintiff verdict. Now we have a situation in
which the law is correctly explained in the charge, there is sufficient
evidence to support the verdict on Claims A and C, but insufficient
evidence for Claim B. The general verdict still does not tell us
whether the jury relied on this flawed claim in finding for plaintiff.
Here, however, it seems reasonable to assume that a jury following its
instructions was more likely than not to have based its verdict on
Claim A or Claim C. The jury was correctly instructed on its duty to
weigh evidence in reaching a verdict and correctly instructed on the
law. Why assume that the jury based its decision only on a claim that
was so weak that the court of appeals rejects it? If the court of appeals finds that Claim B should not even have been submitted to the
jury (that is, a judgment as a matter of law would have been proper),
it seems unlikely that the jury based its decision on the evidence-free
claim rather than on the adequately supported Claims A and C. If the
court of appeals finds that while plaintiff met its burden of production
on Claim B a jury verdict for plaintiff based on Claim B would be
clearly erroneous, it still seems more probable that the verdict was
based on the claims with solid evidentiary support. In this situation of
insufficient evidence for one of multiple claims, then, an efficiencymaximizing court of appeals could choose to affirm rather than reverse. There would then be no efficiency gain in terms of remand
from the special verdict format.
On the other hand, the court of appeals might weigh the mere possibility of harm more strongly and reverse and remand even in this situation. This is still a policy decision, because we still do not know
whether the jury relied on Claim B. If the policy is to reverse general
verdict cases when any error is found, the broad-form special verdict
would again allow an efficiency gain if the jury's separate answers on
Claims A, B, and C demonstrated that Claim B was not necessary to
support the judgment.
Real cases, of course, are more complex than these examples. Appellants rarely urge only a single error, and challenged claims are
rarely conceded to have only a single flaw. Nevertheless, we can learn
something from the examples about the universe of cases with separable claims. First, it is only if the court of appeals adopts a policy of
remanding all cases, no matter how unlikely (yet possible) that the
error affected the outcome, that special verdicts work an across-theboard efficiency gain. Second, the potential efficiency gain is most
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likely to occur in cases in which a legal theory is in such a state of ex
ante uncertainty that there is a substantial probability of error. Legal
errors, more than evidentiary problems, are able to cause harm to the
losing litigant and are therefore more likely to require remand. Third,
when there exists a potential efficiency gain, a broad form question for
each claim and its associated defenses is narrow enough to avoid unnecessary remand.
The various possibilities for appellate standard of review are not
mere academic fantasies. In the federal courts alone, several different
approaches exist. Furthermore, state systems also treat the question
differently. For example, the United States Supreme Court held in an
antitrust case that when a general verdict is returned and one of the
multiple theories submitted to the jury is legally erroneous, reversal is
required. 16 ' In a more recent criminal case, however, the Court distinguished between legal and factual errors in a multiple theory case,
upholding a general verdict when one of the 1possible
bases of convic62
tion was supported by inadequate evidence.
The lower federal courts also follow divergent rules, sometimes
without realizing it. Some circuits state a general rule, without qualification, that when one of two or more issues submitted to the jury was
submitted erroneously, a general verdict cannot stand because it cannot be determined whether the jury relied on the improper ground. 163
These cases presume harm. Other cases use various harmless error
analyses to determine whether an error in one of multiple claims undermines a general verdict. These cases tend to make harm a rebuttable presumption, requiring reversal unless the appellate court can be
"reasonably certain that the jury was not significantly influenced by
issues erroneously submitted to it."'" The Ninth Circuit uses a harm161. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19,
29-30 (1962).
162. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991) ("Jurors are not generally
equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is
contrary to law ....Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the
option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to
analyze the evidence.") (citations omitted).
163. See Bone v. Refco, Inc., 774 F.2d 235, 242 (8th Cir. 1985); Neubauer v. City of
McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1575 (5th Cir. 1985); Collis v. Ashland Oil and Ref. Co., 722
F.2d 625, 627 (10th Cir. 1983); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 646 (3d Cir. 1980).
164. Asbill v. Housing Auth. of Choctaw Nation of Okla., 726 F.2d 1499, 1504 (10th
Cir. 1984) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247,
1258 (8th Cir. 1980)); see also Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 37 F.3d 1181 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding harmless an error in explaining law where directed verdict would have been
proper); Kirschner v. Broadhead, 671 F.2d 1034, 1040 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating it is
prejudicial error for the court to give instructions unsupported by evidence unless the
record shows error clearly harmless); Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir.
1970) (examining entire record, including opening statements, evidence, and closing
arguments and concluding that "[t]o permit ...issues which occupied positions of...
relative insignificance in the trial to be treated now as so important as to make their
submission to the jury prejudicial would not serve the interest of justice").
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less error analysis which does not seem to include a presumption of
harm. That court considers that it has "discretion" to affirm a general
verdict if one theory is correctly stated and supported by the evidence:
In deciding whether to exercise this discretion, the reviewing court

should determine the potential for confusion of the jury which may
have resulted from an erroneous submission of a particular claim or
cause of action, whether privileges or defenses of the losing party
apply to the count upon which the verdict is being sustained so that
they would have been considered by the jury with reference to the
count, the strength of the evidence supporting the count being relied upon to sustain the verdict, and the extent to which the same
of fact apply to one or more of the theories in
disputed 16issues
5
question.

Later Ninth Circuit cases seem to distinguish between legal and factual errors. 6 6 At least some Seventh Circuit cases have upheld par-

tially-flawed general verdicts as long as one theory remains that will
support the general verdict, apparently applying a presumption that
the jury verdict is based on the correctly stated and supported
theories. 67
In diversity cases, the circuits are also split as to whether they
should follow federal or state standards regarding the standard of review in these cases. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that federal law controls even in diversity cases, while
the Second, Sixth, and Eight Circuits believe that Erie requires them
to follow state law. 68 The states, in turn, often follow the so-called
"two-issue rule." Under this standard of review, if at least one of the
theories submitted to the jury in the general verdict was properly submitted, the case 69must be affirmed regardless of errors in other included theories.'

165. Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1980).
166. See Syufy Enters. v. American Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 1002 (9th Cir.

1986) (recognizing but not resolving difference between law and fact); Brocklesby v.

United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that judgment must be
reversed if any theory is legally defective).
167. See McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating
that, to win an appeal, defendant must show that none of plaintiff's theories would
support a judgment); Cross v. Ryan, 124 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1941) ("[I]f there is substantial evidence to sustain any one count in favor of each plaintiff, the general verdict
must be upheld.").
168. See Walter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence as Question of
Federal or State Law in Diversity Action, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 451 (1996).
169. The two-issue rule has been followed in at least the following cases: Larriva v.
Widmer, 415 P.2d 424 (Ariz. 1966); Berger v. Southern Pac. Co., 300 P.2d 170 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Knight Realty Co. v. Caserta, 10 A.2d 597 (Conn. 1939); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So. 2d 1181, 1185-86 (Fla. 1977); Olson v. Kelly
Coal Co., 86 N.E. 88 (11. 1908); Harper v. Henry, 169 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio App. 1959);
Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 336 S.E.2d 472, 473-74 (S.C.
1985); Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co. v. Umenstetter, 291 S.W. 452 (Tenn. 1927); Barson v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Keller v. Hartman, 333 S.E.2d 89 (%V.
Va. 1985). The application of the rule sometimes depends on whether appellant has
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From the standpoint of the trial judge deciding how to draft a jury
charge, there are a limited number of situations in which, thinking
only of the possibility of avoiding unnecessary remand, she might
choose broad form special verdict questions rather than the general
verdict format. These situations would occur only when: (1) the jurisdiction's appellate courts have adopted a standard of review under
which the predictable error would cause a general verdict to be reversed; and (2) multiple claims are genuinely separable in the sense of
involving little or no overlap of relevant facts and legal concepts so
that the problem can be properly isolated. This is most likely to occur
when the law regarding one of the multiple claims is unclear and,
therefore, more vulnerable to reversal. If the court of appeals also
reverses multiple-theory cases in which one claim lacks evidentiary
support, the trial judge would also decrease the probability of remand
by using a special verdict format in cases in which one of the claims
has very weak evidentiary support. If, on the other hand, the jurisdiction uses the two-issue rule or otherwise affirms partially-correct general verdicts, there is no efficiency gain to be had from the special
verdict format.
Finally, note that in all of these examples there is something of a
shift in workload going on; the efficiency gains must be offset to some
degree by increased time and effort in other parts of the process. The
burden of identifying and correcting errors moves back and forth between the trial court and the court of appeals. 170 For example, a standard of review in which the court of appeals examines only the
language of the charge and then reverses for any error requires comparatively little time from the appellate judges. They must read the
charge and read the law, but they need not undertake the time-consuming task of examining the trial record. The trial court, on the
other hand, will bear the burden of the re-trial. Conversely, a standard of review that requires the court of appeals to search the entire
trial record to determine which theories are strongly supported and
whether harm is likely will consume considerably more appellate time.
The trial court, though, may be spared the time and attention needed
171
to re-try the case.

preserved error by requesting a special rather than general verdict. See Colonial
Stores, 355 So. 2d at 1186.
170. Changes in standard of review can also shift power between the trial courts
and courts of appeals. See Louis, supra note 51, at 993-97. If changes in verdict format
change the types of issues the court of appeals is willing to review, that, too, will shift
control between trial and appellate courts.
171. To the extent that it takes more time to draft a charge in special verdict format
than to draft a general charge, the trial court also loses some efficiency from the special verdict process. This loss must be offset against the potential but uncertain efficiency gain in avoiding remand.
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THE IMPACT OF CHARGE FORMAT ON
PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGE

In theory, court procedure merely provides a neutral setting in
which the substantive claims of the parties are displayed. Procedure is
not supposed to affect the outcome of a case. It is nevertheless true
that procedural rules can confer advantages and disadvantages on the
litigants. This becomes particularly disturbing when a procedural rule
operates to confer predictable benefits on particular types of litigants
and thus actually increases the likelihood that those favored litigants
will prevail. This part examines whether jury charge format is apt to
have an uneven impact on the parties.
Inherited trial lawyer wisdom holds that general verdicts favor
plaintiffs while narrower question formats favor defendants. This belief flows from the stereotype of the jury as a sucker for an emotional
argument.' 7 2 It is said that all the plaintiffs lawyer with a general

charge need do is elicit the sympathy of the jurors; law and evidence
go out the window.
Empirical research, too, supports the theory that splitting claims
into multiple questions tends to favor defendants while unitary treatment favors plaintiffs. In an experiment involving actual bifurcation
of trials, Professors Borden and Horovitz found that unitary trial conditions resulted in significantly more liability verdicts against the defendant. 17 3 The differences between general and special verdicts
might easily follow the same pattern.
It is true, as noted above, that the general verdict format makes it
simpler for a jury that wants to consciously nullify the law to reach the
result it wants.' 74 There is, however, no empirical evidence that juries
tend to operate that way or that such nullification would favor the
plaintiff. 75 In the current climate of distrust of "frivolous lawsuits"
" 6
In
and increasing insurance premiums, the opposite may be true.17

any case, the impact of charge format on party advantage is probably
much more subtle.
172. Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948) ("The
general verdict enhances, to the maximum, the power of appeals to the biases and
prejudices of the jurors, and usually converts into a futile ritual the use of stock

phrases about dispassionateness almost always included in judges' charges.").
173. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 86, at 25-27.
174. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
175. The recent study by Professors Clermont and Eisenberg, for example, shows

judges to be more pro-plaintiff than juries in certain classes of cases. See Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 1126.

176. See Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 Harv. L Rev. 1408, 1427
n.39 (1997) (quoting Edward Felsenthal, Juries Display Less Sympathy in Injury
Claims, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1994, at B1 (discussing a study demonstrating that civil
juries have become less sympathetic to plaintiffs since the 1980s: -Some evidence
exists to suggest that 'powerful and deep-pocketed advocates of reform have spread

their message so successfully in the media that juries have changed their behavior.'")).
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There are several ways in which a narrower charge format, especially one in "separate and distinct" form, favors defendants over
plaintiffs. 77 First, narrower questions increase the burden of achieving unanimity. Consider the sample charges provided in part II. For a
plaintiff to prevail on the merits in a case submitted by general charge,
that plaintiff must convince the requisite majority of jurors to find for
plaintiff on one question. They need not all agree on the legal theory;
they need not agree on the factual theory. They simply must agree
that defendant breached some duty to plaintiff. The jury needs
neither legal nor factual unanimity on a narrower theory, and only a
single answer is needed to support plaintiffs judgment. 178
Note what happens as the judge moves toward a narrower and narrower charge. In "broad form" special verdict format, the plaintiff
must convince the requisite majority of jurors to agree on the same
legal theory to win. They must all think that defendant was negligent,
or that it breached a warranty, or whatever, before plaintiff will prevail. Thus, plaintiffs job has gotten harder. Now consider the "separate and distinct" format. Each cause of action is further subdivided
into factual theories, and each factual theory is divided into components based on the elements of the legal theory. Plaintiff's job is
harder in two ways. First, plaintiff can only win by convincing the
jurors to agree to a particular atomized factual incarnation of the
cause of action. This is much more difficult even than agreeing on
"negligence" as opposed to "warranty." Second, a "no" answer on
any element eliminates the cause of action; plaintiff needs all "yes"
answers while defendant needs only one "no."1'7 9 If inferential rebut-

tal issues are submitted, plaintiff bears the additional burden of having
to prove parts of the cause of action more than once.
The complexity of the special verdict also works against the party
with the burden of proof and the party seeking to change the status
quo, usually the plaintiff. Until a judgment can be entered, there will
be no order to pay. The longer a resolution can be delayed, the
greater the possibility that memories will fade and the burden of proof
become insuperable. Even procedures that lead to mistrials or new
trials therefore, by acting to delay a final judgment tend to benefit
defendants. Procedures that tend to require the expense of a retrial
177. It is more accurate to say that it disfavors the party with the burden of proof,
or the party who seeks to disturb the status quo. Stated conversely, the general verdict favors the party with the burden of proof.
178. Hodges & Guy, supra note 35, § 36. There is also, however, a disadvantage to
the plaintiff because the plaintiff has only a single chance to win. One defendant
answer completely eliminates plaintiff's case. The fact that the burden of proof rests
with plaintiff, so that defendant can prevail without proving anything, leaves the general verdict advantage a qualified one.
179. Granholm & Richards, supra note 72, at 532; see Norman J. Wiener, Simple
Lessons from a Complex Case, Litig., Spring 1986, at 14, 16 ("For defendants, there is
another, less noble, but important, reason for using a special-verdict: It can give a
defendant a lot of chances to win.").
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will also tend to benefit institutional defendants and disadvantage
one-shot litigant plaintiffs.'
Special verdicts, including the general
verdict with interrogatories, have the ability to work this way. The
very existence of multiple questions with multiple answer lines increases the likelihood of mistrials and of conflicting answers. Both
will prevent the entry of judgment and postpone the day of reckoning.
That kind of delay hurts the plaintiff. Further, if it is true that defense
lawyers as a group are apt to be better prepared to take advantage of
legal complexities,' 8 ' then the very complexity of the special verdict
will also tend to help defendants who can better preserve error and
otherwise deal with charge related issues.
There are other aspects of the special verdict format that have the
ability to benefit defendants, but whether that benefit materializes depends on the court's choices within the special verdict format. For
example, the structure of the special verdict creates the potential for
greater impact of instructions and definitions. The comparative impact here, if any, depends on the trial court's implementation of the
special verdict scheme. It is already true that lawyers try to get the
court to define legal terms in a way that is biased in favor of their
clients."a2 In special verdict formats the stakes are higher, as both
sides strive to achieve an aggregation of instructions that "nudge" the
jury toward their side.' 83 These instructions are potentially more powerful in swaying the jury because they tend to be placed immediately
before or after the question in which the legal concept is used. Thus,
the special verdict format gives the trial court the ability to grant
favor, by wording or by placement, to one side rather than the other.
This is not an inevitable result of special verdict format. Judges may
achieve complete evenhandedness. But the potential for the choice
180. See Thomas W. Church, Jr. et al., Pretrial Delay: A Review and Bibliography
12 (1978) (asserting that civil defendants benefit from delay); Paul RJ. Connolly &
Saundra Smith, The Litigant's Perspective on Delay: Waiting for the Dough, 8 Just.
Sys. J. 271, 276 (1983) (suggesting that plaintiffs are more likely to suffer from financial and emotional pressure during pendency of lawsuit).
181. Institutional defendants and their insurers, at least, are more apt to be repeat
litigants and to employ lawyers experienced in dealing with the types of issues involved in the litigation. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speclations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95, 97, 114-19 (1974)
(describing advantages that those who are repeatedly involved in litigation enjoy over
the occasional participant); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive
Proceduralism,61 Tex. L. Rev. 929, 939 (1983) (reviewing Julius Byron Levine, Discovery: A Comparison Between English and American Civil Discovery Law with

Reform Proposals (1982)) ("[I]ncreasing [procedural] complexity ...makes it much
more likely that the outcome of the case will be determined by the relative skills of
the lawyers in manipulating the rules ....).
182. See, e.g., Baldwin et al., supra note 43, § 1.02[4] (explaining that suggested
instructions come in two versions: "plaintiff's instruction" and "defendant's instruction" covering the same legal concept).

183. See generally Hodges & Guy, supra note 35, §§ 19, 20 (instructions couched in
terms of victory or defeat; instructions that "tilt" or "nudge").
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and placement of instructions to influence the jury is stronger, and the
federal judge's decision is unlikely to be reversed as an abuse of
discretion.
In addition, the court can choose to confer advantage by selecting a
single question (generally an affirmative defense), placing it at the beginning of the charge, and conditioning the jury's ability to reach the
remainder of the questions on a particular answer to that first question. In other words, unless the jury answers that first question in a
certain way, the jury will answer no further questions. One commentator advised defense lawyers to take advantage of this possibility:
"When using a special-verdict form, pay careful attention to the organization and number of questions. A defendant will want some of
the earliest inquiries to be knockout questions: If the jury can answer
'no' to the question, then it need not proceed to any others."' 184 The
existence of pro-plaintiff answers, even if not technically material,
could "produce[ ] a less favorable [defense] setting for appeals and
postjudgment motions. And it might [cause] later battles over the collateral estoppel effect of the verdict."' 85 Empirical research supports
the value of the parties' struggles over the order of questions. Professors Borden and Horowitz discovered that the order in which issues
were submitted to the jury affects the outcome, so that a charge structure that lets a judge control the order of the jury's deliberations may
easily have an effect on outcome in a predictable way.' 86
A third implementation-dependent power shift could arise at an appellate level. It is also possible, though not necessary, that using narrower questions would encourage appellate courts to intervene more
often in the fact-finding process and thus shift power from juries and
trial judges to appellate judges.' 87 With certain adjustments to its own
standard of review and briefing rules,' 88 the existence of particularized
findings of fact would make it easier for the appellate court to examine the evidentiary support for a narrow issue of fact without having to review the entire record. The court could also control the
extent of remand: retry the particular issue, or retry the entire case.
This kind of review would move more control of fact-finding to the
184. Wiener, supra note 179, at 16.
185. Id.
186. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 86, at 26. Similarly, singling out particular questions to include as "interrogatories" accompanying a general verdict can highlight particular theories.
187. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631, 642 (acknowledging that appellate control of jury instructions increases control over trial results).
188. For example, the court could require the parties to identify all parts of the
record relevant to fact issue and separately reproduce those parts, thus reducing the
burden of reviewing the trial court record. It could also adopt a standard of review
that allows harm to be analyzed issue by issue, also facilitating review of particular
issues. The standard of review is the primary determinant of the allocation of power
between trial and appellate courts. See Louis, supra note 51, at 997.
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appellate level and thus is a power shift in itself. If, in a particular
jurisdiction, there were a difference between trial and appellate courts
in terms of their tendency to favor certain parties, i 89 it could create
advantages or disadvantages for certain types of litigants.
It appears, then, that conventional wisdom may be correct, although
for more complicated reasons than those generally assumed. As a
general rule, broader question formats will tend to favor plaintiffs and
narrower question formats will tend to favor defendants merely because of the nature of the structural differences and the existence of
the burden of proof. There is no neutral position with respect to
breadth and number of questions. In addition, narrower question for-

mats create greater possibilities for favoring particular parties, especially defendants, should courts choose to do so. Under current law,
these kinds of subtle advantages and disadvantages will be within the
discretion of the trial court and not, therefore, a source of reversible
error.
VI.

USING THE CHARGE TO EMPOWER THE JURY

The jury is an institution with constitutional significance. Its operation implicates both political and process values. The form of the
jury's instructions, because it controls the process by which the jury
reaches its verdict, has an important effect on the jury's political and
process roles. A meta-theory about proper jury instruction format,
therefore, must be founded on principles that maximize the jury's ability to fulfill both of those roles.
This article has reviewed the interaction between the form of instructions and the values underlying the jury's function. It has demonstrated that it is the general verdict that best allows the jury to do its
job. The general verdict is the best promoter of the jury's political
function, enabling it to infuse its decisionmaking with community values. It is also the most likely to lead to accurate verdicts, because it
maximizes the jury's ability to process and analyze the complex evidence and legal concepts before it. Even efficiency concerns should
lead us to prefer the general verdict in most cases.
We also know that there are some things we do not want to do with
instruction format. The instructions should not be drafted in badly
organized legal jargon. The jury cannot be empowered by confusing
it. The courts should also refuse to employ narrow questions, whether
in "separate and distinct" law application format, narrow questions of
historical fact, or questions framed as variables in a mathematical
formula. All improperly interfere wvith the jury's political role and its
ability to reach an accurate verdict. They are also apt to decrease,
rather than increase, the efficiency of the jury process.
189. Id. at 1010 (stating juries are "regarded as more 'liberal' or responsive to the
needs of certain constituencies than are appellate judges").
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Like Rule 49(a) special verdicts, narrower questions accompanying
a general verdict, as allowed by Rule 49(b), improperly interfere with
the jury's thought process, thus impeding the jury's political and process functions. Because it by definition requires overlapping answers,
this format also multiplies the possibility of conflicting answers, decreasing jury efficiency. By highlighting certain questions as more important, it can also confer procedural benefit on one of the parties. 190
The point of jury instructions is not to test the jury, or confuse it, or to
highlight favored claims and defenses. It is to help the jury to use
holistic decision-making processes and community values in assessing
the evidence and understanding how the law applies to the events
leading to the lawsuit. 19 1

There may be a very limited number of situations in which the jury
is best empowered by choosing a broad form instruction format'"
rather than the pure general verdict because the existence of separate
answers helps to preserve the effect of its verdict. This exception
arises in cases involving ex ante likelihood of reversal on appeal based
on unsettled substantive law, a pro-reversal standard of review, and a
request at the trial level to use a special verdict format. In a case
involving multiple claims and in which the law underlying one of those
claims is unclear, the trial judge submitting a case by general charge
runs the risk that a wrong choice on the unclear claim can undermine
the entire verdict if the case is reversed on appeal.' 93 Even though the
jury may not have based all or part of its decision on the erroneously
explained claim, the court of appeals will likely reverse. If, however,
the judge uses broad form submission of the unsettled claim, separating it from the remaining claims, the court of appeals can deal with
that portion of the jury's verdict separately and the jury's decision on
the remainder of the case remains untainted.' 94 There may even be
situations in which there are two identifiable possibilities for the content of the unsettled claim, one of which is likely to be correct. In
190. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2511 (stating that the use of a general
verdict with interrogatories can spotlight the more important issues and tests the general verdict); see also Brown, supra note 139, at 339-40 ("Rule 49(b) offers.., nothing
but trouble because it seeks to meld a general verdict and special answers with the
high likelihood of conflict which extinguishes both.").
191. Thus, whatever the format chosen, the court should use its discretion to give
the jury a written copy of the charge. See Hastie et al., supra note 119, at 231 (explaining how providing jurors with a written copy of the court's instructions aids jury comprehension and understanding); Wright & Miller, supra note 14, § 2555 (noting that
the judge has discretion).
192. See supra Part II (providing sample charges in the hypothetical Cleaver case).
Remember that "broad form" is a term of art for omnibus, but narrower, questionsgenerally one question per legal theory-and does not mean the same as "general
verdict."
193. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
194. The use of broad form rather than separate and distinct questions limits the
damage to the jury's political and process functions while accommodating the need
for more identifiable findings.
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such a case, the judge may be able to submit each possibility as a
broad form question (with appropriate explanations to the jury), and
whichever way the court of appeals rules will enable a judgment to be
entered based on that jury's verdict. 195
What about the effect of substantive law more generally? Our understanding of the purposes underlying substantive law already affects
our beliefs about the content of jury instructions. 196 Should the purposes underlying substantive law also affect the format of those instructions? In complex multi-party cases, it is already likely to require
at least separate answer lines for each party. Substantive law may also
require separate questions to be answered on issues such as comparative fault or contribution and indemnity. Beyond that, what role
should the substantive law play in deciding what form the instructions
should take?
While I believe that the general verdict should be preferred in any
case, it is particularly imperative that it be used in cases in which the
substantive law explicitly includes issues of public values, issues which
will ask the jury to decide how the community expects a person to
behave. This would include not only issues of constitutional law, but
also issues such as reasonableness of conduct. Whether a case involves driving a car, manufacturing a product, negotiating a contract,
investigating an insurance claim, arresting a suspected criminal, expanding a business' market share, or marketing an investment, the
jury's decision requires it to give content to community standards and
to apply those standards to the facts as it finds them. These are the
kinds of issues in which a narrower format is particularly likely to interfere with the jury's decisionmaking process.
It could be argued that the substantive law, or rather the policies
underlying the substantive law, sometimes require a more structured
verdict in order to get more focused jury findings. The general verdict, as noted above, allows a plaintiff to prevail without unanimity as
to any particular theory. In the hypothetical Cleaver case in part II,
for example, Cleaver could prevail on a general charge by convincing
four jurors that the mower was defectively designed, four jurors that
the mower was defectively manufactured, and four jurors that Acme
was negligent, without convincing all twelve jurors of any single legal
theory. The jurors have agreed on a general level that the defendant
is culpable. Is that enough?
A general verdict might be seen to be substantively undesirable if
the aims of tort law require that all jurors believe that, for example,
some particularcommunity norm has been violated, or that some particularrisk was unacceptable given particular costs. In the case of tort
195. See Brown, supra note 139, at 344.
196. See Gilles, supra note 60; Edward J. McCaffery et al., Franiingthe Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341 (1995).
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law, such a requirement would likely be based on the deterrent function of tort judgments, and a claim that the defendant would need to
have specific notice of what it has done wrong in order to know how
to modify its behavior in the future. Thus, the substantive law underpinning for a special verdict requirement would not be fear of an irrational jury, or opposition to the democratic institution of the jury, but
a need 1for
more specific information about community standards as
97
applied.
Such an argument seems to have no logical stopping point. If the
substantive policy requires a finding of negligence as opposed to strict
liability, would it not also require a finding of negligence in design as
opposed to negligence in manufacture? Or a finding of negligence in
designing the outlet guard rather than the rotary blade? Or in designing the third bolt from the end on the outlet guard rather than the grill
on the outlet guard? I am unconvinced that the substantive law requires that degree of jury specificity, 198 but I leave the influence of
substantive law values as an issue that deserves empirical research.
As a political matter, a legislative body might want to disadvantage
certain kinds of claims by mandating the use of special verdicts. The
format would be chosen specifically because it can make claims more
difficult for the party with the burden of proof. For example, a jurisdiction might decide that parental rights are so important that they
should not be terminated without specific findings of misconduct, and
specific juror agreement on those findings. Such a jurisdiction could
require special verdicts in suits to terminate parental rights.' 9 9 Or a
state could choose to protect the media's role in reporting on matters
of public significance by requiring special verdicts in defamation cases.
These kind of intensely political decisions to favor or disfavor a cause
of action, however, should be made with extreme care and not on an
ad hoc, case by case basis.
With these limited exceptions, the general verdict must be the
norm. Rule 49 should be amended to reflect the policies underlying
jury charge format. First, while special verdicts should not be completely eliminated, the rule should provide that the general verdict is
strongly preferred. For example, the rule could require general verdicts absent extraordinary circumstances, and require those circumstances to be specified by a trial court using a special verdict. Second,
current Rule 49(b) should be eliminated. The general verdict accom197. As discussed above, if an argument for greater specificity of findings is based
on the allegedly greater consistency of judge-made decisions, the unreliability and/or
irrationality of juries, or the desire for a less democratic decisionmaker, the argument
is based not on substantive law but on political or process values.
198. For an argument questioning the theory of deterrence on psychological
grounds, see Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U.

Kan. L. Rev. 115 (1993).
199. Cf. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990)
(terminating parental rights on broad form findings).

1998]

CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1893

panied by answers to interrogatories has all the problems of narrower
formats generally, with an added likelihood of creating conflicting answers. The format is thus more likely to result in inaccuracy, inefficiency, and in undermining the jury's political role.2 1 Nor does it
have advantages that offset these risks. While one commentator has
argued that Rule 49(b) could be used to help avoid reversal in partially flawed cases, 20 1 a broad form special verdict would accomplish
this goal without adding the enhanced potential for confusion and
conflicting answers.
CONCLUSION

It is not inertia but principle that should lead courts to use general
verdict format in sending cases to the jury. A change to narrower
forms of submission, by interfering with the jury's role, would create
rather than solve problems. "[S]hifting the mode of decision strikes at
the very heart of the process and threatens to change the law.1' 21 The
civil jury is a vital and important institution that deserves to be preserved rather than undermined. The general verdict must be protected from the reformers' zeal.

200. See Brown, supra note 139, at 339-40. Eliminating this second type of special
verdict would also have the incidental benefit of reducing court confusion in trying to
tell the two types apart. The confusion is not immaterial, because rules about preserving error are sometimes different for the two verdict types and thus law-yers can unwittingly lose their clients' rights to raise issues on appeal.
201. See Ernest Guinn, The Jury System and Special Verdicts, 2 St. Mary's U. 175,

179 (1970).
202. Marcus, supra note 8, at 785.
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